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Over the past two decades an increasing number of theorists and practitioners have called for a thorough rethinking of the underlying assumptions of the concept of rrental
illness and the traditional psychiatric nodes of responding
to mental disorders.

The work of this group of writers has

come to be referred to as the "antipsychiatry" literature.
The insights of this perspective center largely about a rejection of those theories and methods of treatment that are
based upon the medical model.

Many writers point to the use
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of traditional psychiatric practice as an oppressive instrument of social control.

While much of this perspective is

directed toward the analysis of specifically sociological
factors there have been few attempts by sociologists to provide focus for the claims that have been made.
This paper proposes a synthetic sociological framework
with the intention of providing sociological focus for the
otherwise disparate insights found within this literature.
A general model is constructed by incorporating aspects of
the labeling perspective, the sociology of knowledge, and
Marxian analysis.

The model provides the analytical tools

for investigation of the manner in which "mental illness"
as a concept, and the phenemenon which it allegedly describes, are rooted in the nature of everyday life.
The framework that is developed places particular emphasis upon the political dimensions . of everyday life.

This

dimension is especially useful in explicating the role of
labeling as a device to discredit the claims of . people as
they attempt to identify the oppressive aspects of . their
social environment.

The nature .of socialization within

Western culture is analyzed in terms of the various factors
which are instrumental in the mystification of consciousness
and its relationship to "mental illness."
The observation is made that the majority of the claims
that are proffered by the "antipsychiatrists" are devoid of
a firm empirical foundation in that they rely primarily upon

)
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findings from case studies and a series of loose inferences.
An attempt is made to overcome this problem by mapping out
the empirical points of departure for the model by developing a set of testable propositions and corollaries.
It is concluded that a radical sociology . of knowledge
framework does provide a useful method of conceptualizing
the

11

tive.

antipsychiatry 11 literature from a sociological perspecThe validity of the claims themselves, however, must

wait until much more of the empirical evidence is in.

It is

pointed out that extreme caution be taken to avoid contentions to the effect that all mental disorders can be fruitfully analyzed by this framework or that capitalism per se
causes mental disorder.
Suggestions are made as to the likelihood that some
diagnostic categories, more than others, may be subject to
analysis by this model.

It is implied that further research

into the role of biopsychological factors will undoubtedly
show the interactive effects of such factors with defective
socialization and oppressive social relationships.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION

over the past two decades there has been a growing
recognition of the need to rethink modern analysis of the
phenomenon we commonly call mental illness.

Although the

number of theorists and practitioners that have written in
this mode has grown steadily and their works have identified
collectively as the "antipsychiatry movement" there is
little evidence of serious attempts to systematize this approach sociologically.

In fact there have only been a few

attempts to bring exemplary writings together in book form.
~!though

all of the writers make reference to the role of

social structural, institutional, and other specifically
sociological factors in shaping perspectives on the topic
they move little beyond debunking the predominant use of the
medical model in response to insanity.

What this paper will

attempt to do is to off er a sociological framework that incorporates the otherwise somewhat disparate insights found
in the "antipsychiatry" literature.

Our

thes~s

for this ef-

fort will be to the effect that the "antipsychiatry"

litera~

ture can be reconceptualized within a radical sociology of
knowledge framework yielding a more coherent and fruitful
analysis of the phenomenon of insanity.
There have been few sociological attempts to conceptu-

2

alize the issues of insanity that have been raised in the
"antipsychiatry" literature.

This paper attempts to pro-

vide a sociological focus for these issues through a radical
formulation of the sociology of knowledge.

Being such an

exploratory endeavor the paper will surely raise more questions than it will answer; nevertheless it is hoped that it
will result in at least the skeleton of a sociological accounting of insanity that is superior to both the medical
model and the insightful but theoretically incoherent
"antipsychiatry" literature.

One has to feel a bit uneasy

about trekking through largely uncharted theoretical territory; regardless of what is offered here, a "final" statement at this exploratory stage will always be ipso facto an
incomplete statement that will invariably be subject to a
myriad of logical attacks and greatly in need of futher
clarification.

The reader is advised to view this paper as

an attempt to formulate the beginnings of a different sociological approach to insanity.

To force this paper into a

logically refined and complete form denies its very purpose
and nature as an exploratory, hypothetical, and tentative
investigation.
TERMINOLOGY AND THEORETICAL BACKGROUND

The works of Thomas Szasz, appearing first in the

" emergence of a perspective on
mid-fifties, chronicle the
madness not in keeping with the traditional use of the med-
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ical model.

Szasz has written most extensively on the sub7

ject, and his book The Myth of Mental Illness (1974) is a
good synopsis of his approach although it is exemplified
here with reference almost exclusively to hysteria.

The

next group of works in this general tradition is from R.D.
Laing appearing first in 1960 (the Divided Self).

The

works of these two psychiatrists along with the sociologist
Erving Goffman (Asylums, 1961) were virtually the only major
examples of a nascent "antimedical-model" stance on insanity·
until quite recently.

Recent efforts to collect the emerg-

ing writings and research formulated in this vein include
three books, The Radical Therapist (1971) edited by Jerome
Angel, Radical Psychology (1973) edited by Phil Brown,* and ·
Labeling Madness (1975a) edited by Thomas Scheff, and the
emergence of two journals; Rough Times (formerly The Radical
Therapist) and the Journal of Radical Therapy.

While

Scheff's book attempts to cast this general approach within
the labeling perspective, the other recent sources do little
more than imply the possibility of interpreting the "anti- .
psychiatry" literature from a general Marxian or radical
perspective.

These two general approaches to systematizing

the insights from the "antipsychiatry movement" are ridden
with both incoherence and contradiction.
*Brown's text is apparently the first to identify this
approach to insanity under the rubric of "an tipsychia try. "
See chapter two.
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Incoherence is exhibited by both strategies.

First,

the labeling perspective itself has suffered extensive criticism for its own lack of theoretical clarity and coherence;*
Scheff offers no major improvements in this book.

Further-

more he fails to include any of the works of Laing, Szasz,
or Goffman, thus falling far short of dealing with the full
range of concerns that are characteristic of the "antipsychiatry" literature.

As Walter Gove (1975a:61) has ob-

served, the labeling theorists of mental illness do not
forward a general explanation of the phenomenon itself.

Al-

though Scheff (1975:90-92) does suggest the notion that mental disorder is related to the repression of emotion he
comes far short of offering a general explanatory framework.
The radicals are als.o guilty of a lack of 1 coherence in their
I

approach insofar as they make reference to a Marxist psychology as if it were something already well formulated in
the writings of Marx, which is simply not the case, as is
pointed out by Adam Schaff (1970:40-2), Peter Berger (1969:
ix), Richard Lichtman (1975:58), and Richard Ropers (1973:
42) •
The contradictory characteristics of the. radical approach can be found in the efforts to overcome the problem
just mentioned by developing a Marxist psychology.

The very

*See the discussion in Don Gibbons and Joseph Jones
(1975:124-134) which is a concise accounting of the major
criticisms of the labeling perspective •

..
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use of the wording a "Marxist psychology,'! represents a contradiction in terms.

Marx, in the few places that he grap-

ples with the issue of the human individual, deviates markedly from a psychologistic perspective as it is implied in
the terms "a Marxist psychology."

For example, he had noth-

ing but sharp criticism of Feuerbach for postulating "an
abstract - isolated - human individual" (emphasis in the
original).

In contradistinction Marx contended that "the ·

essence of man is not an abstraction inherent in each particular individual.

The real nature ·of man is the totality

of social relations" (1964:68).

Thus, while it might make

sense to talk of . a Marxist social psychology (or sociopsychology) , to speak of a Marxist psychology goes against
the grain of a truly Marxist perspective.
The central emphasis of the radical "antipsychiatrists"
is to focus attention on social relationships in modern capitalism as the true locus of what have traditionally been
viewed as personal psychic disorders.

Yet they persist in

their efforts to develop a psychology which tends toward
movement of the causal nexus in the direction of the individual.

This is undoubtedly an inadvertent consequence

of the training and background of the radicals which is almost exclusively psychiatry and psychology.

It remains a

contradiction, however, and reflects a serious problem in
their work.

The need to overcome this deficiency is point-

ed out by Angel (197l:xvi) in arguing that the therapist,
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"expert as he may be at · analyzing interpersonal . forces, he
is of ten ignorant about forces controlling the larger society in which he lives.

This must be exposed and clarified."

Michael Glenn (197l:xi) identifies a serious consequence of
an individualistic approach in therapy in that "emphasis on
the individual cools people out • • • by turning their focus
from society • • • to their own 'hang-ups. ' "

Yet neither

writer moves beyond radical psychology as a framework f:rom
which to answer the problems they . find in traditional psychology.
This contradiction has been an historical feature of
Marxism since its rebirth in the 19SO's and 'GO's in the
universities.

Since that time the writings of Erich Fromm,

Reuben Osborne, Wilhelm Reich, and Herbert Marcuse have
largely served as the modern Marxist psychology.

Keith

Brooks (1973:322-328) contends that the movement toward a
Freudian perspective was more a reaction to cold sterile
behaviorism than a logical and coherent effort to develop a
Marxian microview of social relations.

Although Brooks also

fails to see much beyond a Marxist psychology himself he
does offer the most complete refutation of the type of psychology found in Freudianism. *

The ·following passage cap-

tures his view of Freud's psychology:
*On this point, see also Richard Ropers (1973:43) and
Peter Berger and Thomas Luckmann (1967:194).

I
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Freudianism, as a microview that considers the
"truth" of human beings to reside outside of their
social relations, does not even understand individuals • • • the onlycontrTbution Freud made was in
providing the basic concepts to be used in the mystification and obfuscation ~ people's everyda.I_ ·
lives. Fre'Udianism is paft of the problem •
. (Brooks I 1973: 322) (emphasis
the original)

rn

What Brooks calls for is a theoretical framework that
offers "a definition of the individual as a social being, as
a being-in-the-world" (1973:333).

What follows ·. in this paper

can be viewed largely as an attempt to wrestle with this
question.
What we hope to discover here is a theoretical strategy
that will incorporate both the labeling perspective and a
radical perspective on the issue of insanity.

The belief is

that this can be accomplished through a radical interpretation of the sociology of knowledge.

In the next chapter we

will deal explicitly with that radical sociology of knowledge
framework.

In Chapter III a brief analysis utilizing a rad-

ical sociology of knowledge will be employed in regards to
psychiatry and the concept of "mental illness."

Chapter IV

will focus attention on the politics of everday life and
offers a radical .interpretation of the processes involved.
In Chapter V a series of testable propositions deriving from
a radical sociology of knowledge framework is presented.
Chapter VI will try to draw some conclusions on the basis of
our sociological excursus into insanity.
A BRIEF NOTE ON MARXIAN ANALYSIS AND INSANITY

8

As we have implied already, Marxian analysis of sociopsychological phenomena is poorly developed and this paper
is suggestive of a possible strategy to overcome this deficiency.

In . this endeavor several issues ·emerge which

would threaten the clarity of the analysis that follows.
Thus, for purposes of clarification we need to offer a very
brief discussion of some of the factors involved in a Marxist analysis of insanity.

Our analysis will almost exclu-

sively limit attention to insani!ty as it occurs in Western
culture under the reign of capitalism.

If the argument pre-

sented here were to postulate a simplistic unilinear causal
argument that capitalism-causes-insanity, the facts would
immediately invalidate our contentions.

Obviously this is

·not the case and yet for some reason critics of Marxian
analysis tend to force it into these kinds of formulations
(undoubtedly some Marxian arguments are sufficiently rhetorical to warrant this criticism); Marxist analysis should not
be construed so as to minimize the problems within those
.forms of political economy which both precede and follow
capitalism.

A truly Marxist perspective simply focuses upon

the dialectical relationship between the base, substructure,
and superstructure in any society.

Our analysis does not

mean to imply that insanity did not exist before capitalism
or that it will disappear with its demise.

Instead, we sim-

ply contend that the forms of oppression will always differ
qualitatively within different political economies.

I'S'

How
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much they differ quantitatively is an empirical question.
It would seem to follow, however, that smaller differentials
in power would yield a smaller potential for oppression.

We

still await these future societal forms of more equitable
distributions of power and privilege.

When they manifest

themselves then, and only then, can we subject this question
to empirical test.

At present, however, we can point to the

way in which control of the means of material production in
capitalist society also effects control of the means of intellectual production.

We can look to the factors upon

which power is based in this society and the way in which
that power is used to maintain itself politically from "macrolevel" to "microlevel" contexts.
The causal influence of oppression .or coercion that is
related to insanity in the following pages should not be interpreted as an explanation for all cases of insanity.

We

are merely suggesting the way in which some mental disorders
might be a function of various oppressive social relationships or how that some mental deficiencies may be intensified
· by them.

Conclusions as to the accuracy of this contention

must be based . upon research that follows from this line of ·
causal reasoning.

The general parameters of such investiga- 1
I

tions are outlined in Chapter V.

CHAPTER II
A RADICAL SOCIOLOGY OF KNOWLEDGE
We can begin our effort to ford this theoretical river
by stepping in at the point marked off by the sociology of
knowledge framework as it has been generally expounded by
Peter Berger and Thomas Luckrnann (The Social Construction
of Reality, 1967).

What is envisioned here will not be an

extraction or formulation of a separate theory on the question of deviance in that we will be directing attention away
from the deviant(s).

This strategy is not new as the label-

ing people advocate a similar procedure; yet in turn they
wish to inspect the situational context and those persons
and institutions that attach the label of deviance.

What

we shall see here is an attempt to ) focus attention away from
deviants one step further toward an inspection of everyday
life and the nature of social reality.

In this way we can

discuss deviance in the same context that we would use to
deal with conformity.

Within this approach, conformity is

equivalent to sanity; that is, accepting the status quo as
real and singular.

Challenging the status quo, or insanity,

evokes social control which itself, through labeling, serves
to maintain or reify the contemporary conceptions of reality ·
as natural facts which ipso facto exclude any alternative
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conceptions of reality not contained within the commonly
shared symbols, signs, and meanings manifested in everyday
language.

Social control, at least in part, results in the

attachment of a label to a challenger which discredits him
or her and the alternative perception of reality that is
presented.

An investigation of these issues will

necess~-

· tate discussion of processes
of internalization within a
.;•
general symbolic interactionist frame of reference which itself is intricately linked with the sociology of knowledge
(at least in Berger and Luckmann's notion of such).

The

reader should be sensitive, however, that the central focus
of this paper is an endeavor to extend a radical social perspective to microlevel social phenomena, uncovering the
sociopsychological violence and oppression that characterizes much of everyday life and consciousness as it is manifested in the issues of insanity.
A question may arise at this point as to the advisability of incorporating bourgeois theory in a radical formulation of theory.

One perspective in Marxist thought sug-

gests that any bourgeois theory is inherently laden with
class bias that invalidates any of its insights.

A growing

number of radicals have advocated ]1.u s.t such a procedure,
however, in response to some of the deficiencies in the
Marxist perspective.*

*For. example

As is pointed out by Richard Lichtman

see R.W.J. Dingwall • (1975), Donald Hansen
(1976), Richard Ropers (1973), and Mark Wardell (1975).
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(1975:58) radicals can benefit by studying the works of
some bourgeois theorists.
But Marx left important issues unsolved; and time
has added new ones. It is not enough for us to repeat Marx's formula. The dialectic of subjectivityobjectivity has not been fully grasped as yet, and
we have much .to learn about the issue • • • from
bourgeois writers like Mead (with his emphasis on
the social origin of the self), [and] social interactionists like Seely, Blumer, Berger and
Luckrnann (sensitive to the intentionality and obj~ctification of social rules) • •
Corning f rorn the other direction, we will take Berger
and Luckmann seriously in their advocacy of a humanistic
stance in sociology that would require "a systematic accounting of the dialectical relation between the structural realities and the human enterprise of constructing reality - in
history" (1967:186).

At the outset, at any rate, we are

probably on safe ground to infuse radical insights into their
work without distorting its fundamental intelligibility.
Another question that we need to explore is the manner
in which we can discuss labeling perspective.

Perhaps the

easiest way to deal with this matter is to examine the role
of labels in the maintenance of cultural themes.

For our

purposes we can view such themes as part of the superstructure which, according to Charles Bolton (p.17), can be seen
as equivalent to what Berger and Luckrnann call the symbolic
universe.

These cultural themes permeate the other "phe-

nornenologically objectified products of the social process."
The ' most significant of these products is language in that
it provides for sharing and transmission of cultural themes
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or meaning and reality between groups, individuals, institutions, and generations.

The particular aspect of language

that is central to the immediate question is the role that
it plays in social control.

Thus, language provides for the

transmission of cultural themes and also protects those
themes in providing labels that discredit social actors that
challenge their legitimacy.

For example, Trent Schroyer

(1975) contends that the dominant cultural theme in America
is the · "technocratic strategy in which politics and science
are related integrally as the means for a more efficient and
effective decision-making process" (p.19).

According to

Schroyer this grants a scientistic legitimation to the "manis-pawn-of-natural-necessity theme" that coerces us into a
perception of the present form of our social world as inevitable when it really is a contrived device which serves·
as "a justification of the perpetuation of private power
and privilege" (p.25).

The reality of the barbarism that is

engendered within such a society is unmasked by dissenters
only to be denied by labeling such dissent as treason. This
label discredits the challengers and the observations that ·
they make.

The dynamics of the process include the credit-

inq labels or titles of these doing the labeling as is re-

vealed in some observations made by Brooks (1973:349) about
the label of paranoia.
Paranoia, like other Freudian concepts, has the
primary effect of discrediting a person's life .
situation as the ground for behavior. The political puq>os.e of this is • • • obvious • • •
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such as when Bruno Bettleheim labeled people who
were protesting the firing of Marlene Dixon from
the University of Chicago as paranoids, or when
Thomas Foran, who was the chief procecutor of the
Chicago Eight said that all talk about political
repress.i on in this country was paranoia ( ! ) •
Given a political context the dynamics of discrediting
labeling are fairly straightforward.

The issues :become

somewhat more muddied when this process is analyzed within
the context of the politics of everyday life (i.e. the politics of the family, shcool and workplace).

A detailed

analysis of the political features of everyday life in these
contexts will be dealt with later; for now the focus will
be directed to the general manner in which these are a ref lection of the class struggle that characterizes the "macropolitical" sphere.
It can be argued, as Schroyer (1975:17) does, that
domination in modern society "is broader than economic exploitation and alienation."

For instance, one could easily

agree that it would be ludicrous to postulate the direct
operation of the class struggle in the politics of the family, but, to overlook its indirect effects would result in a
serious shortcoming.

One's perception of his or her family

and its everyday operations is largely the result of the
socialization one receives from schools, churches, and the
media.*

Class control of these sources of consciousness

*of course the family itself, as well as peers, are
significant sources of influence for this perception, but
these sources of influence are typically instrumental in
aiding the transmission of cultural values and norms tha t
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production would effect a crucial albeit indirect effect of
the class struggle as Lichtman (1975:54) so lucidly describes.
Power over material production confers power over
the production of consciousness. The ruling class
exercises its power to distort consciousness through
its control over the means of intellectual production - schools, churches, the daily press, etc.
I
think it is clear that this model fits the pattern
of the base-superstructure, and locates the source
of mystification in the control over the superstructure which the ruling class exercises as a
consequence of its dominance over material wealth.
This explanation follows from Marx's {]967a:438) own
contention that "the class having the means of material production has also control over the means of intellectual production."

Lichtman's conception reveals a "dialectical re-

lationship between base and superstructure, productive
forces and relations of production, etc." (1975:56) an understanding of which is the only justifiable manner in which
to break social reality down into these categories.

For

example, he states that the social relations of production
cannot "be divorced from the remaining legal, moral, sexual,
and religious institutions through which dominance and submission are internalized" (1975:57).

In other words, the

superstructure is both a consequence of the base as well as
a source of its reinforcement and reification.

It becomes,

in the minds of people, a "natural" feature of the environment.

Labels, symbols, language, cultural themes, in-

they_ receive themselves from schools, churches, and the
· media.

•
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stitutions, and so on interact dialectically in providing a
Weltanschauung that reifies the base as both legitimate and
singular.

Inasmuch as language plays a crucial role in this

interaction by virtue of being the essential mode of expression at all levels it would follow that themes of dominance
and submission permeate the politics of everyday life as
witnessed in the family, school, and workplace.

We have

already discussed the way in which labels are employed in
traditional political contexts to discredit dissidents reacting to oppression and barbarism.

The point here is that

discrediting labeling also occurs in the context of the politics of everyday life to invalidate the claims of those
who choose to identify its various oppressive dimensions.
A radical sociology of knowledge framework informs us
as to both the dialectical and phenomenological aspects of
this process.

Berger and Stanley Pullberg (1965) take a

large step in this direction in offering a "critique of consciousness" that incorporates two Marxian concepts: alienation and reification.

In their analysis they separate the

socially necessary processes - objectivation and objectif ication - from those extensions or extremes of these processes - alienation and reif ication.

They argue that while

social life requires objectivation (e.g. making tools or
similar objects) and objectification (e.g. the "name" given
to the tool which establishes distance between man and product) the processes of alienation and reification are "de
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facto characteristics of the human condition" (p.201).

Ali-

enation is the . point in the phenomenological process at
which the product becomes an alien facticity that is no
longer recognizable as a product.

Reification is the point

in the process of alienation at which "the characteristic of
thing-hood becomes the standard of objective reality" (p.200)
(emphasis in original).

These phenomenological processes

.occur .within the framework of social structure which, according to Berger and Pullberg, is the result of the historical
nature of objectivation.

Berger and Pullberg describe the

relationship between man and social structure as "a dialectical one.

That is, social structure is produced by man and

in turn produces him . • • man produces himself as a social
being through social structure" (p.202).

In The Social Con-

struction of Reality Berger and Luckmann expatiate upon the
phenomenological aspects of these insights but fail to extend any of the dialectical insights found in Berger and
Pullberg's article, although they (i.e. Berger and Pullberg)
imply the wisdom of developing a "critique of everyday life
that can proceed in a phenomenological and a Marxian
manner • • . " (p.211).

Although they · describe social struc-

ture as "a coercive instrumentality" (p.202) their insights
are not radical in that they choose to deal explictly with
only the phenomenological taken-for-grantedness of the world
as an a priori feature of social control while merely imply-
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ing its role in violent or oppressive social control. *
In Herbert Marcuse's (1964} analysis of modern society
social control is described as being less blatant and observable and ever more mystified and coercive.

The unwit-

ting response of societal members as they participate in
the reality that is defined by the controls does not deny
that they (the controls} really exist but rather "it only
testifies to the efficacy of the controls" (p.8}.

Marcuse's

argument is that .the controls are so effective that they
"appear to be the very embodiment of Reason for the benefit
of all social groups and interests - to such an extent that
all contradiction seems irrational and all counteraction
impossible" and therefore protest or "intellectual and emotional refusal 'to go along' appears neurotic and impotent"
(p.9}.

Society thus is submerged in a ." one-dimensional re-

ality" that is sufficiently enshrouded in mystification so
as to deny the possibility of its own negation.

What hap-

pens to those who envision the ability to transcend the
reality of the status quo - those who perceive that reality
has more dimensions than are peddled hypnotically by "the
makers of politics and their purveyors of mass information"
(p.14}?

According to Marcuse such dissenters are sufficient-

ly diffused centrifugally by the reign of "objective" one-

*Violence as it is used here does not refer to physical
violence per se but to what David Cooper (1973a:l28} discusses as a "subtle, tortuous violence" that is often perpetrated
by ostensibly "helpful" professionals.
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dimensional reality that they can be handled by psychiatrists
and thereby be "cured" (p.71).
For now we can turn our attention to the analysis of
labeling as a phenomenological process.

A beginning point

for this exercise is the discussion in Berger and Luckmann
(1967:30-34) of typificatory schemes or the process of typification.

They contend that social actors enter face-to-

face interactions with a set of typifications of the other
person.

These typifications are subject to modification as

interaction progresses and one realizes that some or all
typifications of the other are contradicted by incoming in- ·
formation.

One may typify the other as grouchy or guff, for

instance, only to find in an interactional episode of a matter of minutes that this person is not grouchy but in fact
quite amiable.

Berger and Luckmann discuss such interactive

settings in such a way that we are left with the impression
that both actors in a situation are equally empowered to alter the other's typifications.

Obviously there are few sit-

uations in which both parties are equivalent in terms of
their power to modify the other's typifications.

This over-

sight effects a serious misrepresentation of many or most
interactional settings.

There are at least two ways in which

the most powerful of two actors can with some degree of permanence 'attach a label or typification to the other.
first is exceeding subtle and imperceptable.

The

While the weak-

er actor may speak to the more powerful or prestigious actor

20

within an original mode of expression that assumes one typi. ficatory scheme the latter may listen and then speak within
a different mode.

The subtlety of the latter's power will

generally cause the former to shift to the mode of expression
utilized by the latter thus being forced into the accompanying typifications.

Thus, if a "patient" is complaining about

the dynamics of family, work, or school, the psychiatrist
may be listening and speaking in terms of mental disorder or
neurosis.

Inevitably the . "patient" will soon be tail.king in

these terms as well, thus molding him- or herself into the
psychiatrist's typifications. The second strategy is more
blatant and coercive.

The more powerful actor may partici-

pate in the interaction by simply asserting a typification
or label which forces the weaker actor into a "damned if I
do - damned if I don't" situation. That is to say that the
weaker actor has two choices: (1) to respond by denying the
typification, in which case his or her continually frustrated
denials eventually reach an emotional level that is identified by the more powerful actor as symptomatic of the typi. fication; or, (2) to refuse to respond to the other's

clai~s,

in which case his or her silence is taken as an admission to
the verity of the label.
Berger and Luckmann contend that there is heavier reliance on typifications "as they are removed from ·t he 'here
and now' of the face-to-face situation" (1967:33).

This

implies that face-to-face interaction is seldom, in the later
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stages, characterized by typifications or labels.

Such a

notion runs counter to the reality of many instances in society in which highly institutionalized role behavior creates
the contingencies for the predominant use of labels, categories, diagnoses, typifications, and so forth.

A police

officer arresting a juvenile, for example, may often rely
upon a typificatory scheme that has been formulated in relation to dealing with large numbers of juveniles over an
extended period of time and passed on to new recruits by the
older officers.

In such cases the person is labeled as a

particular type of person because the observed or suspected
behavior is "characteristic" of that type.

As Berger and

Pullberg (1965:206) have observed, the behaviors in such
situations "are perceived as standing separately from their
performers."

They contend that actors are often related to

simply in terms of being embodiments of roles.

In the in-

itial stages of an episode, however, there exists a considerable degree of ambiguity or a variety of potential role
ascriptions.

Our police officer, for instance, may find a

juvenile with a rock in his hand standing outside a school
building where a window has been broken.

While the question

could be: "What explicit behavior has occurred?"; the ques. tion very often is: "What type of juvenile offender is this?"
In other words the officer is likely to ascribe a role which
would predispose the actor to a particular behavioral category.

The implications of this distinction are significant
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inasmuch as the same situation could result in different
role ascriptions yielding at least four definitions of the
situation:

(1) the window was already broken and the youth

is about to break it out completely;

(2) the youth accident-

ally broke the window while throwing at something else;
as a simple case of vandalism; or,
ing to "break and enter."

(3)

(4) the youth was attempt-

A variety of factors may affect

the officer's eventual definition of the situation such as
the type of language, clothing, and gesticulations that are
exhibited by the youth.

Kai Erikson (1967:11-12) describes

this process as the operation of a screening device.
The screening device which sifts these telling
details out of the person's over-all performance,
then, is a very important instrument of social
control. We know very little about the properties
of this screen, but we do know that it takes many
factors into account which are not directly related
to the deviant act itself: it is sensitive to the
suspect's social class, his past record as an of~
fender, the amount of remorse he manages to convey,
and many similiar concerns which take hold in the
shifting moods of the community. This may not be
so obvious when the screen is dealing with extreme
forms of deviance like serious crimes, but in the
day-by-day filtering processes which take place
throughout the community this feature is easily observable. Some men who drink too much are called
alcoholics and others are not, some men who act
oddly are committed to hospitals and others are not,
some men who have no visible means of support are
hauled into court and others are not - and the difference between those who earn a deviant label and
those who go their own way in pe.ace depends almost
entirley on the way in which the community sifts
out · and codes the many details of behavior to which
it is witness.
The eventual definition effects a role ascription that
fits the officer's typificatory scheme which, at least in
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part, has its roots in cultural themes as they are reflected
in the community. *

Thus, a working-class youth clad in lea-

ther jacket and jeans, employing "ghetto .lingo" stands a
good chance of being cast into a criminalistic role yielding
the most severe behavioral category as a definition of the
situation.
What occurs in such situations is a crystallization of
roles and understandings that are resistant, in varying degrees, to modification.

Once the typification, label, or

role is ascribed, the original ambiguity of the situation is
phenomenologically replaced by a concrete social construetion or definition which is the basis for any further processes that may be involved.

According to Edwin Shur (1973:

120-126) this original step is called stereotyping, which is

followed by retrospective interpretation and negotiation.
"Retrospective interpretation is the process by which once
an individual is identified as deviant, he is seen in a totally 'new light.' "

The phenomenological nature of this

process is described by Harold Garfinkel (1956:421-22).
The work of the denunciation effects the recasting
of the objective character of the perceived other:
The other person becomes in the eyes of his condemners literally a different and new person. It is not
that the new attributes are added to the old "nucleus." He is not changed, he is reconstituted • • •
The new identity is the "basic reality." (emphasis
*see also Don Gibbons' (1976:38-46) discussion of these
influencing factors in a treatment of "offender-police characterist~cs and police decisions" and "offender-police interaction" as they relate to juvenile delinquency.
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in the original)
Thus, the labeled person's past is reinterpreted within the
parameters of the label.

In cases such as alleged delin-

quency or "mental illness" the categories or diagnoses are
so vague and ambiguous as to engender retrospective interpretation in sometimes very extreme or strained dimensions
as we will soon observe.
Negotiation refers to the bargaining between the labeled person and the labelers regarding the terms of their
relationship.

Power is an important factor in all cases of

bargaining, and the lopsided relationship between the psychiatrist and the patient is no exception.

The patient is at

an obvious disadvantage; even if he or she should exhibit
behavior that objectively challenges or contradicts the psychiatrist's perception such an "experience will not contradict it," according to Judith Willer (1971:19).
We will find the concepts of stereotyping (i.e. typifying or labeling), retrospective interpretation, and negotiation informative as we turn our attention to psychiatry
and "mental illness."

CHAPTER III
THE SOCIAL CONSTRUCTIONS OF MENTAL ILLNESS
So a sick society invented psychiatry to defend itself
against the investigations of certain visionaries whose
faculties of divination disturbed it.
*
ANTONIN ARTAUD
THE CONSTRUCTION OF A MYTH
Humans show an amazing propensity thoughout history to
accept any plausible explanation for complex phenomena rather than to admit that they don't have even a modicum of genuine understanding.

These explanations are often extremely

simplistic; the product of religious mysticism, generations
· Of interwoven superstitions, or collections of common sense
"insights."

The problem with such formulations is that,

though often far from being true, they do constitute knowledge within specific historical parameters and as such serve
as the basis for action that reinforces that knowledge.

That

is to say that such knowledge often circumscribes the very .
actions that would eventuate in its demise or mod if ica ti on.
Belief that .the world was . flat, for example, for a long period obviated those ocean voyages that eventually disproved it.
*An observatrion made by Artaud (1965:135) who spent
fifteen years of his life in an asylum.
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Knowledge formulated in this way is highly resilient.

An

additional complicating factor of importance is that knowledge very often leads to institutional structures with
various role positions characterized by power and privilege
that have a vested interest in maintaining the contemporary
perceptions and formulations of that knowledge.

When change

does occur it does so very slowly with its early proponents
in danger of being riduculed, ostracized, or worse.

The ex- .

periences of Galileo in astronomy and John Huss in theology
bear witness to an enduring problem in knowledge.
Since New Testament times the Western world has produced a variety of plausible explanations for the phenomenon
now generally referred to as mental illness.

Although one

can find definite improvements in this latest form of knowledge over previous ones, such as those previous beliefs
which led to the "witch hunts" of Puritan New England, we
will examine the ways in which "mental illness" as a social
construction is devoid of the inherent skepticism that enables scientific perspectives to continually modify their
·tentative formulations of knowledge.
At some point in the history of insanity it was no
longer tenable to conceptualize this phenomenon as individuals possessed by demons or spirits.

Szasz (1974:17-31)

points to Jean-Martin Charcot (1825-1893) as the father of
a new response to insanity as a "mental disease."

As a

neurologist and neuropathologist, Charcot postulated from
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his post-mortem examinations of subjects afflicted with various organic disorders that all insane persons suffered from
some other form of neurological defect and were thus also
"ill." *

Charcot thus set psychiatry on the tracks as a form

of medical science.

Charcot accomplished this by his simple

insistence that malingering (i.e. feining symptoms like
those of organically impaired patients) was really an illness
he called hysteria.

Freud inadvertently reveals the unscien-

tific manner in which this "discovery" was made - merely on
the basis of Charcot's prestige.
He explained that the theory of organic nervous
diseases was for the present fairly complete, and
he began to turn his attention almost exclusively
to hysteria • • • [which) had at this time come very
much into discredit . . • The general opinion was
that anything may happen in hysteria: hysterics
found no credit whatsoever. First of all Charcot's
work restored dignity to the subject; gradually the
sneering attitude, which the hysteric could reckon
on meeting when she told her story, was given up;
she was no longer a malingerer, since Charcot had
thrown the whole weight of his authority on the side
of the reality and objectivity of hysterical phenomena. (Freud, 1948:18-19) (emphasis added)
It is pointed out by Szasz (pp.28-29) that Charcot's demonstra.tions and explanations of hysteria were shown by Georges
Guillain and others to be fakes.

Seemingly Charcot could

not admit that hysteria might have causes that were not internal, as his prestige in the matter derived from his role
as a medical scientist; "this meant that he had to base his

* Goffman

(1973:26-27) . contends that the similarity between organic and functional psychoses largely accounts for
the unreflective ·acceptance of the medical model in psychia. try.
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case about hysteria on the premise that it was an organic
neurological illness.

Otherwise, if hysteria and hypnosis

were problems in human relations and psychology, why should
anyone have taken Charcot's opinions as authoritative?"
(Szasz, 1974:26).
.Provided an

One could muse that Charcot had still

~dvancement

for the insane by virtue of reifying

their condition as illness which would accord them an "excused" social status for their behavior.

In fact, however,

the myth propagated by Charcot, Kraepelin, Breuer, Freud,
· and many more performs a disservice for the insane as Szasz
(1~74:24-25)

succinctly explains:

It might seem, at first glance, that to advocate,
and indeed insist, that an unhappy or troubled person is sick - and that he is sick in exactly the
·
same sense and way in which a person suffering from
cancer is sick - is humane and well-intentioned, as
it aims to bestow upon such a person the dignity of
suffering from a genuine illness over which he has
no control. However, there is a hidden weight attached to this tactic which pulls the suffering
person back into the same sort of disrepute from
which this semantic and social reclassification was
intended to rescue him. Indeed, labeling individuals displaying or disabled by problems in living
as "mentally .ill" has only impeded and retarded
the recognition of the essentially moral and political nature of the phenomena to which psychiatrists
address themselves.
It wasn't long after the insane asylum was introduced
as a reform in this country, for example, before contentions
regarding its oppressive potential for the insane, or those
alleged to be insane, were vocalized.

Acquiring the label

of "mentally ill" and subsequent confinement to an asylum
effects a dramatic curtailment of freedom and basic civil
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rights and therefore constitutes at least the potential for
flagrant oppression.

According to

s.

Kirson Weinberg (1968),

as early as 1849 legal suits were being brought against individuals responsible for commitments.
While asylums were a decided improvement over previous
·practices, such as chaining insane persons to dungeon walls
(Europe) or auctioning them off like chattel for hard labor
(America), they did not represent a rational response to the
state of psychiatric theory and treatment practices.

As is

pointed out by Szasz (1974:18), David Rothman (197l:xv-xvi),
and Goffman (1973:28-30), asylums were the societal response
to a social problem which could best be handled by warehousing the troublesome individuals in institutions where they
would be "out of sight and out of mind."

Often a person

finds him- or herself committed to one of these institutions
contrary to his or her own wishes.

According to one set of

statistics (Weinberg, 1971:183) over 45 percent of the admissions to mental hospitals are other than voluntary. Some
like Szasz (1974:260-261) are primarily concerned with those
subjected involuntarily to treatment and commitment but
Seymour Halleck (1971), another psychiatrist, rejects this
strategy.

In a manner more fully sensitized to the politi-

cal functions of the psychiatrist he depicts them as legitimators of the system of knowledge inherent in the status quo.
Halleck (1971:36) observes, that while critics like Szasz,
Laing, and others • • • "have pointed out the repressive
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uses of involuntary psychiatry; they have not acknowledged
that even when psychiatric treatment is voluntary it has
profound political consequences."

Psychiatrists argue to

the contrary, however, contending that their actions are
purely medical and therefore politically neutral.

This con-

tention is questionable in light of Halleck's insights into
the nature of psychiatric intervention or treatment.
In dealing with the individual, the psychiatrist
usually emphasizes that person's internal problems.
Psychiatric treatment that focuses upon internal
conflict encourages the patient and those who influence him to believe that his social environment
is not contributing to his misery and that the environment is therefore adequate. So long as treatment does not encourage the patient to examine or to
confront his environment and so long as treatment
protects those who have adversely affected that patient from considering their own behavior, the net
effect of treatment is to strengthen the status quo
• . • It is apparent that whatever the psychiatrist
does, he will either encourage the patient to accept the existing distributions of power in his
world or encourage the patient to change them • • •
There is a strange and unfortunate tendency among
psychiatrists to believe that professional activities designed to change the status quo are political and activities tending to strengthen the status
quo are medical and neutral. This kind of thinking is illogical. By reinforcing the position of
those who hold power, the psychiatrist is performing a political act whether he intends to or not.
Once this fact is appreciated, the psychiatrist's
search for political neutrality begins to appear
illusory. (Halleck, 1971:35-36)
The picture of psychiatry presented here by Halleck
portrays it as a mechanism to correct the failures of the
socializing agencies such as the family, school, church, and
workplace.

Most, however, are successfully socialized to

passively accept the oppressiveness of their environment.
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The observations on this point that have been made by Terry
Kupers (1976) are instructive.

In the social structures of

capitalism Kuper's contends that Marx's (1967b:72) observation that human relations are subject to reification is still
valid; that the "

• social relation between men • • • as-

sumes in their eyes, the fantastic form of a relation between
things."

The history of capitalism is the constant acceler-

ation of social relationships to maximize efficiency and
profits.

The rationalization of productive forces has pro-

ceeded to the point where "the human qualities and idiosyncracies of the work appear increasingly as mere sources of
I
error" (Georg Lucacs,
1971:91).

In this world people "feel

like things, more the object than the subject of their lives"
(Kupers, p.111).

According to Kupers, such a society . "is

'schizophrenogenic.' But common as it is, outright schizophrenia is not the plight of the entire population.

Most

people find a different way to live with reification"
(p.117).

This is accomplished in socialization.

In the course of "normal" socialization, moments
arise where the child is encouraged to ignore or
be numb to certain events and experiences. As he
or she learns which events and experiences are not
to be noticed the child is shaped into conventional consciousness. (Kupers, 1976:118)
Those that deviate from this mode of behavior are responded
to by some of the social control agencies of society.

These

violations against conventional consciousness effect a class
of deviations that fall outside of the more obvious forms of
deviance.

.Most categories of deviance are clearly delineated

32
- burglary, murder, embezzling, etc.

~

but some are not and

fall under the type of deviance ref erred to as mental illness; a residual category, according to Scheff (1975b:7),
which by its very. nature

is vague and ambiguous.

Ambiguity

is an integral feature of "mental illness" as we will see
in more detail in the next section of this chapter.
The extensive experience that Halleck relates of working with university students and in private practice with
typical middle-class patients unmasks the general "cooling
out ... function of modern psychiatry.

The dissident student

experiencing extreme stress is encouraged to displace his
attention to . some less volatile and stress producing activ- ·
ity; end of dissidence.

The middle-class wife suffering

from the oppressiveness of a domineering husband is encouraged to develop other interests that will defuse her complaints of being unhappily married; "successful" termination
of marital discord.

In this manner psychiatry helps people

to adjust to oppressive environments in the family, school,
work, or politics.

Those who don't adjust find themselves

warehoused; the failures of both socialization and the remediation of psychiatry.

According to Halleck (1971:28)

psychiatric patients are usually responding to the oppressive
influence of some other person, group, or institution although they may be partially or even totally unaware of the
source of their troubles.

Emphasis on internal factors will

certainly exacerbate this problem of awareness as will treat-
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ment involving drugs, electro-convulsive shock therapy;. behavior modification, and psychosurgery.

These "innovative

technological advances" are the latest development in the
socially constructed response to an enduring social problem.
The general historical form has been one of increasing effectiveness in isolating and stigmatizing the deviants
rather than modifying those social conditions responsible
for their suffering, although recent developments in family
therapy and milieu treatment are resulting in the emergence
of some attempts to counteract this trend.
THE FALSE SCIENTISM OF PSYCHIATRY

Focusing attention on the contemporary condition of
psychiatry will reveal additional problems in knowledge beyond those that have been raised in a sweeping discussion
of its sociohistorical nature.

The very fact that these

factors are overlooked by the vast majority of contemporary
psychiatrists would indict them of alienated consciousness
as defined by Berger and Pullberg (1965:205):
. . • alienated consciousness, both of world and
self, may be designated as false consciousness .false in the sense that the actual process by which
itself and its world have been produced is forgotten. If this false consciousness achieves a
theoretical formulation, the latter functions as
a mystification (or, if one prefers, as an ideology
• .• • ) • (emphasis in the original)
A mystification or ideology allows for a division of
the social world into false categories such as "good" or
''bad".

The behaviors of people then can be viewed as a re-
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flection of the false category - in our case "mentally ill"
(as opposed to "mentally healthy").

The various diagnostic

subcategories of "mental illness" are extremely vague and
unclear and as such can be used to .stigmatize a wide range
of behavior.

For example, the label of schizophrenia is

identified by Scheff (1975b:8) as a catch-all for a variety
of "offenses" against the implicit norms of a culture.

The

similarities between diagnostic psychiatric categories like
schizophrenia and omnibus statutes as they relate to juvenile delinquency are significant.

As Gibbons (1976:13) ob-

serves, omnibus statutes mark off categories of behavior
"that are so vaguely defined that nearly all youngsters could
be made the subject of court attention."
The same shortcoming in the label of schizophrenia is
unequivocally demonstrated in the research that is described
by David Rosenhan (1975).

He relates a research project in

which eight researchers gained admission to twelve mental
hospitals.

In eleven of the twelve admissions the diagnosis

of feigned hallucinations was schizophrenia.

If we concep-

tualize this initial act as typification or stereotyping, as
we discussed in Chapter II,* the dynamics of the labeling
process will become clearer.

The pseudopatients falsely re-

*In Chapter II we discussed Shur's (1973:120-126) notions of the labeling process as stereotyping, retrospective
interpretation, and negotiation as he uses them in the context of juvenile delinquency. They are employed here to explain some of the dynamics of labeling insanity.
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ported only their initial hallucinations, their names (to
avoid having the label of schizophrenia attached permanently), and their occupations (to avoid special or preferential
treatment by virtue of being viewed as unfortunate colleagues).

When questioned about their background and family

relationships then, they responded with true accounts from
their lives.

Invariably this information reflecting the

background and interpersonal relationships of the "healthy"
pseudopatients was twisted in unbelievable ways ·to ' fit ' their
new and "real" identity.

The label intiated a process of

retrospective interpretation by which all previous events
were viewed as leading up to the current schizophenic episode.

The patient thus is often subjected to a "prepatient"

label which is linked to the "new" label which in this way
is not really viewed as new.

In fact, the original diagnos-

tic session is characterized by Scheff (1975c:l7) as focusing on what diagnostic category is to be employed rather
than on whether the individual is in fact afflicted with a
disorder.

Once specific assignment to a category is effect-

ed the individual has acquired "a master status that excludes
all other statuses

fro~

consideration" (Scheff, 1975e:77).

This includes status as a genuine human being.

The research-

ers in Rosenhan's account reveal the dehumanized nature of
their new status.

Now as subhuman beings there was little

interaction with even the nonprofessional staff.

In fact,

the only way to operationalize the amount of interaction with
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patients was to measure the proportion of the attendants
time spent outside the "cage" (i.e. the room, typically
glassed-in, where records .are kept and from which medication
is dispensed).

Attendants remained in the cage 88.7 percent

of the time they were on duty.

Moving up the hierarchical

staff structure in the mental hospital less and less time
was spent with the patients.

Attempts to initiate interac-

tion with the staff were either ignored altogether or, in
some cases, resulted in beatings.

The mental patient pos-

sesses little, if any, power to negotiate the nature of the
relationship in which he or she is located.
While in the mental hospital there was no instance
where either professional or nonprofessional staff recognized
the "mental health" of a pseudopatient.

In the first three

hospitalizations in which records were kept, however, 35 of
the 118 patients on the admissions wards detected the sanity
of the investigators.

In all cases, the pseudopatients di-

agnosed as schizophrenic were released as "schizophenics in
remission."

The investigators were kept in the hospitals

for stays ranging from 7-52 days (X=l9 days).
How many people are unnecessarily admitted to mental
hospitals?

Admittedly this question is unanswerable but

Rosenhan's research points to some measures offered by psychiatric personnel themselves.

The staff at a research and

teaching hospital doubted, upon hearing the above results,
that the same thing could occur at their institution.

The
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staff was told that in the following three months that pseudopatients would try to gain admission to their hosptial.
During this period they were asked to rate all admitted patients as to whether or not they were genuinely

11

ill. 11

Of

193 patients admitted during the three month period 41 were
judged by at least one staff member with high confidence as
a pseudopatient.

In fact, however, none of Rosenhan's in-

vestigators tried to gain admission to. the hospital during
the specifed period.
One doesn't need to expound upon the potential for
oppression that is demonstrated by this research; it is only
too frighteningly evident.

Suffice it to mention that the

depiction of mental hospitals offered by Ken Kersey in his
novel, One Flew Over the Cuckoo's Nest (1962), .is apparently
rooted more in fact than it is in fiction.
The diagnostic activities of psychiatrists provide a
false sense of scientific accuracy to what are really socially constructed . categories that could be used to typify virtually anyone's behavior.

The mere suggestion that one is

"mentally ill" provides the basis for an unreflective quest
for an adequate diagnosis as has been dramatically demonstrated by Maurice Temerlin (1975)•

He relates the findings

of research . in which a professional actor was employed to
play the role of a normal, healthy, adult male.

An

interview

was taped in which the actor posed as a mathematician who
had read a book on psychotherapy and wanted to talk about it.
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The interview was recorded and played later to 25 psychiatrists, 25 practicing clinical psychologists, and 45 graduate
students in clinical psychology.

Just before hearing the

interview a prestigious professional (a confederate of the
experimenter) commented that the patient on the tape was "a
very interesting man. because he looks· neurotic, but actually
is quite psychotic."

The subjects were asked to diagnose

the man as either mentally healthy, neurotic (with specific
diagnosis), or psychotic (with specific diagnosis).

In res-

ponse 60 percent of the psychiatrists, 28 percent of the
clinical psychologists, and 11 percent of the graduate students diagnosed the actor as psychotic.

No psychiatrist

diagnosed the actor as mentally healthy while 3 of the clinical psychologists and 5 of the graduate students did.
remaining diagnoses were of some type of neurosis.

The

In con-

trol groups that were employed there were no diagnoses of
psychosis.

That psychiatrists, especially, responded in this

manner to suggestion raises serious questions regarding their
susceptibility to suggestions made by family members, employers, and police officers.
Research done by James Greenley (1975) further supports
the notion that psychiatrists merely legitimize the decisions
made by other people regarding control of a person.

Greenley

investigated patients length of stay in a mental hospital as
a function of the psychiatrist's diagnosis as to the severity
of mental impairment and the combined effect of family and
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patient desires.

The findings indicate that the psychia-

trist's diagnosis bears little relationship to the length
of the hospital stay when family and patient desires are
controlled.

The relationship between the latter factor and

length of stay appears to have an impact "apart from the
psychiatrist's estimate of the patient's psychiatric condition" (p.39).

Although, as Greenley points out, the data

aren't conclusive in terms of causal analysis they are clear
in demonstrating that the

psychiatrist-family~patient-hos-

pi tal relationship is more a social process than medical one.
The investigations made by Donald Caetano (1974) and
Movahedi Siamak (1975) provide findings very similar to those
of Rosenhan, Temerlin, and Greenley.

Caetano's experimental

findings provide evidence to support the contention that
psychiatrists operate largely on the persumption of mental
illness which severely biases their judgements at least in
experimental settings.

Siamak reports that over 90 percent

of the biographies that were compiled by college students
which were highlighted by their bleak experiences were judged
by professionals to be characteristic of some type of psychiatric disturbance.
Other research points to the way in which psychiatry
effects a discrimination on the basis of class in regards to
admission to mental hospitals and the type of treatment that
one receives.

The classic study of mental health statistics

in New Haven, Connecticut presented by August Hollingshead
and Frederick Redlich (1958) revealed several interesting
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facts.

Among them was the finding that the rate of treated

"psychiatric illness 11 is three times higher for the lowest
class as for the highest class (four class distinctions being employed, p.210).

For patients in continuous treatment

(over a six month period) the rate is 3.82 times higher for
the lowest class.

While 99 percent of the lowest class pa-

tients received treatment from state-provided hospitals and
clinics only 9.6 percent of the highest class patients had
to turn to these sources.

The lowest class schizophrenics

were receiving either custodial care or organic treatrrent
(drug therapy, psychosurgery, shock therapy, etc.) in 90.9
percent of the cases while only 48.2 percent of the highest
class schizophrenics received this type of treatment (insofar
as you can refer to custodial care as treatment).

While the

picture is not particularly bright for any class in terms of
"treatrrent" it still represents significant discrimination
against those at the bottom of the social ladder.

At this

stage of investigation it would be premature to launch into
a detailed analysis of the role of class distinctions in the
etiology of mental disorders.

The discussion of Marxism and

mental illness in Roger Bastide (1972:18-21), however, raises
the possibility of explicating the role of contradictions
which are most extreme at the lower end of the social spectrum and the possible role of stressful conditions being most
prevalent at this level is also mentioned.

Unfortunately,

Bastide merely mentions such possibilities without offering
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any extended analysis or development.
RESPONSES OF OPPRESSION TO CALLS FOR HELP
The discussion to this point should not be construed
as an argument to the effect that there are not any people
that are characterized by mental confusion, perceptual problems, inability to grapple with aspects of reality that are
necessary for existence, and so forth.

The contention is

that the medical model and the traditional theories of psychiatry do not give us even a modicum of understanding about
these problems of living; what they are, where they originate
in human social relations, or how they might be solved meaningfully.
We can begin to formulate answers to these questions
only by viewing the sometimes bizarre and confused communications of seemingly insane people as complaints about oppressiveness in their social environments or simply as frantic calls for help.

To localize the problem within the in-

dividual is to respond with further oppressiveness to those
calls for help.
Taking the fragmented and "crazy"· communications of
individuals experiencing cognitive distress seriously is a
solid theme running through most of the "antipsychiatry"
literature.
task at best.

Tackling these messages represents a difficult
Laing at one point suggested a useful strategy

which, unfortunately, he has failed to develop.
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As we begin from microsituations and work up to
macrosituations we find that the apparent irrationality of behavior on a small scale takes on a certain intelligibility when one sees it in context.
One moves, for example from the apparent irrationality of the single "psychotic" individual to the
intelligibility of that irrationality within the
context of the family. The irrationality of the
family in its turn must be placed within the context of its encompassing networks. These further
networks must be seen within the context of yet
larger organizations and institutions. These larger
contexts do not exist out there on some periphery
of social space: they pervade the interstices of
all that is comprised by them. (Laing, 1969:15)
Still the analysis framed by Laing moves little beyond the analysis of "psychotic" irrationality made more
rational by viewing it in the context of the family.

What

is needed is a fuller understanding of "psychotic" behavior
as a problem in the sociology of consciousness and knowledge.
Berger and Pullberg have touched on this problem as far as
contending that consciousness and mental health are culturally relative.

To challenge alienated consciousness is to

place oneself in jeopardy of being defined as mentally "unhealthy" and also removes one from full participation in
the social constructions of reality.

Alienated or false

consciousness, strangely enough, may be defined as mental
health or stability which ipso facto places the seeing
through of alienation and reification, or the development of
true consciousness, at the very edge of "sanity."
It [isn't] necessary or even likely that an alienated consciousness is subjectively experienced as
psychological "heal th" is a function of the social
situation. If the latter is defined in alienated
terms, then only those who share this definition
will be psychologically "healthy". For instance,
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in a society that understands it institutions as
an interaction between divine and demonic forces,
an understanding of these institutions in other
terms is likely to be allied with a psychologically "unhealthy" condition or will lead there if
held on to stubbornly in the face of the socially
acceptable explanation of the world. (Berger and
Pullberg, 1965:200)
Therefore the possibility emerges for the person who finally
sees through the "insanity" and oppressiveness of the world
of today and who proposes a "sane" alternative that he or
she may at that very point be close to insanity by virtue of
not being able to share and thus construct the necessary
social dimensions of reality (i.e. objectivation and objectification) for want of common symbols and sentiments.
This insight helps us understand and extend Kupers' (1976:
119) discussion of the possibilities of personal stress and
confusion that may be experienced by one who refuses to be
numb to the reification that occurs in everyday life.
Some individuals more than others, for some reason, refuse to be • • • numbed. But when they proclaim their beliefs, at whatever level of development, they are denied validation in the areas where
their beliefs contradict the conventional consciousness. Repeated enough, in the right combination,
this devalidation can create areas where these
people are unable to evaluate the truth or merit of
their own perceptions and beliefs. They cannot test
social reality because they have no way at that moment to challenge the united presentation of the
conventional view by significant others in their
lives. If they refuse to surrender or alter their
course, seemingly sporadic events may add up to a
consistent pattern whereby they may become unable
to differ with the increasingly consolidated attribution by others that they are first different,
then strange, and finally mad.
Similar, but less insightful observations are made by John
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Berger (1974:135), Halleck (1971:21-26), Cooper (1973a:l55),
and Laing (1973a:75-94).
Two other general pathways lead from conventional reality to some other perception or behavioral mode.

The first

is the mystification of oppression and the second is defective socialization.
When the source of oppression is mystified and "hidden" from the direct perception of an individual the response is likely to be one of frustration that is expressed
inappropriately.

A very oversimplified everyday experience

is illustrative of this general response.

Often while car-

rying on a conversation one or both parties begins acting
rather nervously; fidgeting, squirming - the tenor and volume of the conversation go up as tolerance and rational
thinking go down.

Finally, one member suddenly jumps up

and turns off a loud television, radio, or stereo; for a
length of time the source of frustration and anxiety was not
perceived.

As soon as it was perceived solution of the

problem was straightforward.
always so simple.

Life, unfortunatley, is not

The alienation and reification that per-

vades modern industrial life obscures and mystifies the
various sources of oppression and frustration.

Added to

this already clouded consciousness is the mystification one
thrusts upon oneself by virtue of the fear that is experienced when one does uncover the source of oppression; one
sure way to elicit increased oppression is to identify its
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source.

If this problem is not initially perceived by the

oppressed individual or group its stark reality is thrust
upon them after protests, complaints, or observations have
been vocalized.

Thus, as Szasz (1974:124) points out, an

individual may mask his or her complaints in very bizarre
ways; what he refers to as protolanguage.

This form of com-

munication serves its user in a manner similar to the way
in which Latin terms used to refer to sexual organs do;
they allow one to address delicate subjects while disowning
distrubing implications.

Hysteria, according to Szasz, is

the employment of bodily signs as a general request for help.
These signs mean something very different for the therapist
with a medical orientation.

The person may indeed acquire

someone to listen to their complaints which would tend to
reinforce the use of bodily signs and would also keep the
therapist from really "hearing" the complaints.

The person

communicating in this manner may be very successful in getting the psychiatrist to accept the role they are playing
but inevitably the actor gets typecast - a professional
actor's most dreaded disease, because thereafter they will
never be accepted in another role (p.244-245).

This is an

inherent feature of traditional psychiatry according to
Szasz; the result of a misplaced focus on "mental illness"
rather than on communications.

Therefore the patient speak-

ing and listening in terms of complaints engages in a lopsided relationship with a psychiatrist who is listening and
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speaking in terms of mental illness; the patient will inevitably shift over to the perception of reality inherent in
the latter mode.

The focus is now on internal factors

rather than the distressing aspects of one's environment.
To Szasz (1974:246) this is:
• • • the situation in which most persons called
mentally ill now find themselves. By and large,
such persons impersonate the roles of helplessness, hopelessness, weakness, and often of bodily
illness - when, in fact, their actual roles pertain to frustrations, unhapinesses, and perplexities due to interpersonal, social, and ethical
conflicts.*
Discussion of the idiom cf demonic possession in
Gananath Obeysekere (1975) provides cross-cultural support
for Szasz's contentions.

Obeysekere relates the case of a

Sinhalese woman living in an oppressive family and marital
environment butressed by an extremely misogynic culture.
The woman voices her complaints via the well defined cultural idiom of demonic possession.

Much like the case of

the Western hysteric, our Sinhalese woman is typecast in the
role of the demon-possessed person.

Thus, she must go

through all of the prescribed religious ceremonies.

In ad-

hering to the idiom of demonic possession she gains several
valuable things although she still lives in virtually the
same conditions as before albeit with a new role: she gains
the ear and sympathy of husband, priest, family, and com*szasz is quick to point out that this impersonation
is not always a consciously planned strategy, though often
it is.
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munity; and, in the midst of the religious ceremonies "spirits" speak through her often voicing requests which when
granted provide some niceties for her.
There are two general sources of defective socialization; biological disorders and family structures that preclude "normal" sociopsychological development of children.
The first source is fairly self-evident so we won't take it
up here (this does not represent a denial of the relevance
of factors related to oppression, however) •

The second

source has received much attention as a result of Gregory
Bateson's (1972) observations regarding the "double-bind"
structures in the families of schizophrenics.

An interest-

ing study performed by Morton Schatzman (1975) reveals the
potential relationship between cruel or oppressive childrearing practices and sociopsychic distresses.

The stud.y is

especially interesting because the subject, Daniel Schreber,
was analyzed by Freud.

Although Freud and Schreber never

met, Freud analyzed his disorder by using his published
memoirs as data.

As Schatzman points out, however, Freud

overlooked the importance of another source of data that
still exists.

These data are the eighteen books and booklets

written by Schreber's father who was a physician, orthopedist, and pedagogue.

Many of the elder Schreber's writings

are about his methods of child-rearing; methods he applied
to his own children.

Freud knew of Schreber's father and,

if interested, could have learned (if in fact, he didn't
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know) that Schreber's older brother shot and killed himself
at age thirty-eight.

Schreber, more "fortunate," became a

mental patient at forty-two and spent thirteen of his last
twenty-seven years in mental asylums, where he died.

Sadly,

the irony goes further:
Irony is everywhere. An eminent pedagogue has a
psychotic son; it does not hurt his reputation.
Freud, an avid reader, neglects books on child
rearing - as do his followers - by a man whose
son's childhood experiences he tries to derive.
German parents rear their children by the ideas of
a man whom many people now would see as sadistic
or mentally ill. (Schatzman, 1975:93)
In the case of Schreber the dialectical relationship between
a cultural level of knowledge or consciousness and its reflections and its reciprocal supportive role in microlevel
structures like the family are open to view.

These issues

will be taken up in the next chapter in our discussion of
the politics of the family.
Though Berger and Luckmann say very little regarding
the incidence of insanity their general observation that
reality maintenance in society is relatively successful and
that therefore insanity will be relatively uncommon provides
a necessary backdrop to our discussion.

These challenges

to socially constructed reality will not be serious as long
as they can be diffused and localized within individual
people.

Should numbers of people begin sharing an alterna-

tive conception of reality then the danger of a massive societal shift in realities is present.

Such "mass madness"

(i.e. revolution) is feared because the outcome is unknown.
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Conditions of life may be more or less desirable at present:
in any case they are certainly more concrete than what is
known about the future.

Massive transformations are indeed

rare, and therefore this minimal reality shifting of insanity
can be handled ordinarily by an aspect of the conceptual
machinery of symbolic universe-maintenance ref erred to by
Berger and Luckmann as therapy.
Therapy entails the application of conceptual machinery to ensure that actual or potential deviants
stay within the institutionalized definitions of
reality, or, in other words, to prevent the "inhabitants" of a given universe from "emigrating."
It does this by applying the legitimating apparatus
to individual "cases" • • • Therapy in one form or
another is a global phenomenon. Its specific institutional arrangements, from exorcism t:o psychoanalysis, from pastoral care to personnel counseling programs, belong, of course, under the category of social control • • • Since therapy must
concern itself with deviations from the "offical"
definitions of reality, it must develop a conceptual
machinery to account for such deviations and to
maintain the realities thus challenged. This requires a body of knowledge that includes a theory
of deviance, a diagnostic apparatus, and a conceptual system for the "cure of souls." (Berger and
Luckrnann, 1967:112-113)
Powerful institutional forces are responsible for keeping
sociopsychic problems within the framework of a medically
oriented psychiatry.

Medicine and psychiatry are in them-

selves very powerful social institutions which ipso facto
will be very difficult to change; and yet our analysis demands that very thing.

Western psychiatry is a classic ex-

ample of the class struggle.

Its positions are typically

filled with those of elevated status and privilege endowed
with the power and predilection to treat men and women as
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conunodities; as purely objects.

Its practice is enshrounded

with alienation, reification, mystification and ideology.
An additional significant source of support for the
maintenance of the ideology of mental illness resides in the
nature of the politics of everyday life.

These political

structures are able to maintain their distributions of power
even when challenged by referring the challenger to the psychiatrist as an either severely neurotic or psychotic "case."
As we have already evidenced, this presentation of the "case"
as one of mental illness tends to predispose the context to
one in which the goal is an appropriate psychiatric diagnosis.

By providing such a category and the dynamics in-

volved in doing so the challenger is "cooled out" and the
political structure is maintained.
Responses to calls of sociopsychic distress that are
not oppressive would attempt to decode and interpret the
inappropriate or unconventional communications coming from
the "insane" person.

An appreciation of, and a sensitivity

to, the problems of consciousness on the part of a helping
agent in these situations is crucial.

When these insights

are shared with the person in distress they could be instrumental in minimizing the terror and fear one experiences by
virtue of "breaking out" of previous perceptions of reality.
This should help to facilitate interpretation of "psychotic"
communications that will enable the "therapist" to devise
alterations in the individuals family, s.chool, or work en-
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vironment to promote a more livable situation for the distressed person.

In her discussion of psychiatric treatment

in China, Ruth Sidel (1975) suggests that superior success
in treatment there is based upon procedures and techniques
that promote interaction with the patient, not isolation as
is the case in Western mental hospitals.

She shows how the

patient is progressively worked back into social relationships when particularly oppressive or distressing dimensions
of those relationships have been altered by the therapists
involved with the patient.

Though Chinese psychiatric treat-

ment has some serious drawbacks it does suggest some very
fruitful alternatives to traditional Western psychiatric
practice.

CHAPTER IV
THE POLITICS OF EVERYDAY LIFE
In Chapter II we discussed the possibility of grappling with the reality of everyday life in terms of analysis of its political features in relation to the family,
school, and workplace.

It should be stressed that this is

but one dimension of these structures.

In this type of anal-

ysis our attention will focus upon the various similarities
with "macropolitical" phenomena.

This will help to sensi-

tize us to the role of discrediting labels in the maintenance of these "micropolitical" structures.

Perhaps the most

significant similarity is the fact that power or authority
is distributed inequitably within the political structures
of everyday life.

Thus, in terms of decision-making, for

example, not all parties involved in living under the existing conditions of a relationship have equal power in affecting the decision-making from which the conditions derive.
How much say that children, students, or employees have in
the decision-making process is up to the discretion of parents, teachers (and administrators, school board, etc.),
and employers.

This is not to say that all parents, teach-

ers, and employers are, therefore, oppressive in terms of
the power that they possess; the point is, that the poten-
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tial for oppressions

~

exist.

There is, however, an in-

herent predisposition toward oppression in that these structures tend to focus on the needs of those possessing power
rather than the needs of those who don't.

This feature is

inherent within these structures inasmuch as the needs of
those without power are not vocalized within the decisionmaking process by virtue of being excluded from it except as
they are perceived by those with power in these spheres. In
American "macropolitics," for example, those with financial
power can affect decisions in their favor by financing a program of lobbying in which their needs are vocalized within
the decision-making process; those with less resources are
incapacitated in this regard.*

Those without financial

clout must often voice their needs through demonstrations,
rallies, or other forms of dissidence.

Similarly in the

family, for instance, a youngster may resort to protest to
vocalize his or her needs.

In "macropolitics," as we have

already mentioned, protesters are often labeled as "traitors"
or "anarchists" or some such label which serves to discredit
both them and their protests.

In "micropoli tics" prates ters

are often labeled with psychiatric tags which serve to discredit them and their contentions in the service of maintaining the existing structures involved.

*Obviously

financial power in American politics is
employed in more ways than lobbying, but this aspect is
raised simply to illustrate the similarities within the
politics of everyday life and "macropolitics."
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The structures of family, school, and workplace overlap extensively and to deal with them separately necessitates
an understanding of their dialectical interrelationships.
Each structure helps to reinforce or reify the others by emphasizing different aspects of the same cultural theme.

In

American society the theme which is of importance to us in
this analysis is that of dominance/submission.

There are

other themes that both overlap with this one and support it
in addition to being supported themselves by this basic
theme.

The family is of primary concern in this discussion

by virtue of being the primary socializer for society and
therefore considerably more space will be devoted to it.
THE POLITICS OF THE FAMILY
The family is the fundamental agency by which a person
gains entrance into social reality.

Ipso facto the family

mystifies consciousness in that it is thrust onto the infant as a given.

Berger and Luckmann explain this feature

of primary socialization in a manner that allows us to perceive the original source of mystification that confronts
one in the process of socialization.
Society presents the candidate for socialization
with a predefined set of significant others, whom
he must accept as such with no possibility of opting for another arrangement • • • This unfair disadvantage inherent in the situation of being a
child has the obvious consequence that, although
the child is not simply passive in the process of
his socialization, it is the adults who set the
rules of the game. The child ~.~an play the game
with enthusiasm or with sullen, resistance. But,
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alas, there is no other game around • • • The child
does not internalize the world of his significant
others as one of many possible worlds. He internalizes it as the world, the only existent and only
conceivable woria • • • Primary socialization thus
accomplishes what (in hindsight, of course) may be
seen as the most important confidence trick that
society plays on the individual - to make appear as
necessity what is in fact a bundle of contingencies,
and thus to make meaningful the accident of his
birth. (Berger and Luckmann, 1967:134-135) (emphasis in the original)
The insight offered here points to an inherent problem of
oppression in socialization that is subject to either intensification or some degree of liberation.

While both are

objectively possible the former is much nore likely than
the latter for a number of reasons.

The prospects for lib-

eration from a :unidimensiona£ perceptton of reality are predicated upon an understanding on th.e part of the parents
concerning the nature of social reality.

It is not likely

that this would inevitably follow simply as the result of
the educational experiences of the parents, as the sociology
of knowledge is not integrated into the structure of traditional education.

When liberation from constricted percep-

tions of reality does occur it usually operates from the experiential base of a parent who has rejected the Weltanschauung of his or her own family and adopted another one,
or, in the case of the truly marginal person, a number of
others.

This experience "teaches" one that the world of the

family is something less than inevitable and this knowledge
can be transmitted to children.

Obviously this outcome is

not very likely for many families.

On the other side, there
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are definite political advantages in getting children to accept the existing parental world, not the least of which is
a ready-made legitimating mechanism for their authority and
power.

In other words, unquestioning acceptance of this

world will ipso facto promote unquestioning acceptance of
the parents behavior.

This will both save time and make

matters much more manageable.

What would necessitate con-

siderable thought and effort (e.g. an answer to the inquisitive child's "Why?") is answered with a simple "because."
Not only does this save time in the inunediate situation but
it also discourages the child from asking the question again
in the future.

It also informs the child that everything is

all right as it is: the simple response "because" carries
with it the message that the status quo is both legitimate
and obvious.

The more oppressive response, "because I said

so!", speels out the distribution of power in the family
quite explicitly for the child.

It may be accompanied by

more stringent sanctions which help to hasten the process
by which the child generalizes these experiences to the inhibition of questioning anything.

This makes the family

more manageable and will also help the youngster "fit in"
the classroom and the work-place.

In societies character-

ized by themes of dominance/submission children "are trained
to obey commands by superiors in pursuit of fixed goals
rather than to negotiate with equals in response to changing
conditions."

The organizing principles of this type of
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society are "hierarchy, predictability, and control" which
are "symbolized by the assembly line, the clock and calendar,
and the budget - lifeless apparatus to which human beings
are yoked like beasts of burden.

The ideal person for such

servitude is one who is reliably obedient, predictable, and
orderly" (Scheff, 1975e:80).

Families successful in this

type of socialization rejoice in having a child that is
"good" in school and who will be "reliable" on the job.

In

capitalist societies, where bureaucracy abounds and functions
best with this type of worker, these aspects of socialization are especially emphasized.

This is not meant to be a

unilinear argument of causality postulating that capitalism
causes sociopsychic distress.

Some of these same organiza-

tional forms and interrelationships exist in a variety of
cultures.

It merely points out the fact that these types of

socialization objectives exacerbate the already inherent
mystification of consciousness that exists in the nature of
the family.

As Kupers (1976:118) contends, this type of

society promotes socialization practices which disavow the
existence of oppression even in the very midst of it.

This

we have noted before in his observation that the child is
"encouraged to ignore or be numbed" to certain aspects of
the environment.

The child is encouraged, for example, to

be "numb to parental deception" and to "rationalize that
even blatantly arbitrary punishment is 'for his own good' "
(p.119).

In the case of Schreber, to which we referred
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earlier, Schatzman demonstrates in an analysis of Dr. Schreber's (Schreber's father) writings on child-rearing that the
emphasis was on the total unquestioning obedience of the
child for the child's own good.

A passage from his work

quoted by Schatzman (p.106) illustrates this tactic of using
various types of punishment in order to be:
• • • master of the child forever. From now on
a glance, a word, a single threatening gesture, is
sufficient to rule the child. One should keep in
mind that one shows the child the greatest kindness in this in that one saves him from many hours
of tension which hinder him from thriving and also
frees him from all those inner spirits of torment
which very easily grow up vigorously into more
serious and insurmountable enemies of life. (D.G.M.
Schreber, 1858:60-61)
The "delusional" response of the younger Schreber was
that "God himself was on my side in his fight against me"
(Daniel P. Schreber, 1955:79).

Dr. Schreber advocated a

parental stance that was directed to instilling the belief
in the child that not only was it wrong for him to keep
things from the parent but that it was not even possible.
As Berger and Luckmann imply, if the child maintains participation in this parental world he or she will, in fact, be
incapable of keeping anything from the parent.

What are the

implications of these situations in which a child is not
permitted to develop autonomy of thinking?

From a Meadian

perspective one can speculate as to a breakdown in the development of communication between the "I" and the "me" in
that making indications to oneself about external events
would be severely constricted.

In fact, one could question
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the real possibility of the full development of a "self" in
such contexts.

Laing provides some relevant observations on

this point in his discussion of the case of a chronic schizophrenic girl (Julie) and her family relationships.

The

mother in this case related to Julie as a mere extension of
herself in a manner that disabled her to develop any autonomy.
As Laing (1973a:81) puts it: "genuine self-action seems never
to have become established to any extent, but instead all
action is in total compliance and conformity with outside
directives."

At an early age Julie therefore did all of the

"normal" things that children do with a subtle distinction "In Julie's case, her actions appear to have been trained by
her mother, but 'she' was not 'in' them."

Later we will

pick up at the point at which her "normalcy" became "madness,"
but for now let's examine Laing's observations regarding
Julie's psychotic episodes.

He recounts that, although it

was possible "to carry on a verbal exchange of a kind, but
without her seeming to have any overall unity but rather a
constellation of quasi-autonomous partial systems, it was
difficult to speak to 'her'
cess (the "I,

11

11

(p.95).

Though one sees pro-

according to Mead) there is little evidence

of structure (the "me 11 ) .

In such a case reflective con-

sciousness would appear to be an impossibility.

This in

mind, consider Laing's following observation (p.97):
In so far as reflective awareness was absent,
memory," for which reflective awareness would
seem to be prerequisite, was patchy. All her life
seemed to be contemporaneous. The absence of a
11
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total experience of her being as a whole meant that
she lacked the unified experience on which to base a
clear idea of the "boundary" of her being.
It would undoubtedly be legitimate to contend that Meadian
social psychology would allow that a nonhuman animal could
have an "I" (i.e. a minimal biopsychological functioning)
but it would firmly deny the possibility for this organism
to possess a "me."

Conversely then, if a person like Julie

were denied whatever minimal autonomy is necessary to develop
a "me" then there would either be fragmented partial "me' s"
as "chunks 11 of memory but no coherent "me" capable of thinking or intrapersonal interaction in the Meadian sense; the
person would simply exist as an "I."

This point requires

much further investigation and clarification, but such an
endeavor falls outside of the immediate scope of this paper.
The point to be made is that oppressive factors in the family
may seriously disable the person's ability to identify and
object to that oppression; such persons are locked into a
type of "double-jeopardy" situation.

That is to say that

they may be subjected to oppression which results in a
break-down in normal development of the "self" in the first
place which leads to unconventional modes of reacting to
that oppression in the second place.
What kind of political problems are raised for the
family when protests, however inappropriate or bizarre, are
"vocalized" or communicated?

If the protests are taken

seriously and viewed within the family and the family within
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increasing macropolitical structures, then alteration of
structures and redistributions of power have to be viewed as
alternatives.

History provides one unequivocal observation

in this regard: those in positions of power are the least
willing to deal with change as a viable alternative.

In

most cases this is not even a possible conception for the
persons with power; reality for them is static and nothing
else is real or legitimate; or alternatives are perceived as
threatening to that power.

Within "macropolitical" and

"micropolitical" contexts it is easiest to handle the discomfort of dissidence or protest by labeling it as "treasonous" in the former case and as nmental illness" in the
latter.

The legitimating structures identify the dissidents

as obviously "criminal" or obviously "mad," respectively.
In both cases the argument seems logical because there are
very similar "deviants" whose deviations are not the direct
expression of protest.

One points to criminals that violate

the value system of the society by "acquiring goods" that
they have not purchased and to which they have no "legal"
claim.

The political dissident also violates the value

system by criticizing it in its institutional forms; a misguided logic equates the two violations.

One also points

to persons with observable organic defects whose violation
of norms of behavior include no direct protests.

An equally

misguided logic contends that similar norm violations are
the symptomatology of some other less observable "organic"
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defect.

In both cases labels are employed to discredit the

protester.

According to Scheff (1975d) the ambiguity of

what "mental illness" is and the collusion of family members
against the prepatient results in many questionable cornrnitments.

In Julie's case Laing clearly unmasks the dynamics

of discrediting labeling in an effort to maintain the power
distribution in her family •
• • • the original pattern of her [Julie's] actions
was entirely in conformity with what ner parents
held to be good and praiseworthy. Then, she was
for a time 11 bad," that is those very things her parents most did not want to see her do or hear her say
or to believe existed in her, she "came out with."
We cannot at present say why this was so. But that
she was capable of saying and doing such things was
almost incredible to her parents. All that emerged
was totally unsuspected. They first tried to discount it, but as the offense grew they strove violently to repudiate it. It was a great relief,
the·refore, when, instead of saying that her mother
wouldn't let her live, she said that her mother had
murdered a child. Then all could be forgiven.
"Poor Julie was ill. She was not responsible. How
could I ever have believed for one moment that she
meant what she said to me? I've always tried my
best to be a good mother to her." (Laing, 1973a:74)
Yes, poor Julie; her "psychotic" communications have no basis
in reality.

That is obvious because the poor girl says some

extremely bizarre things: "a child has been murdered";
a tolled bell" (or "told belle .. );

"I'm

"I'm tailor-made" or "I'm a

tailored maid"; and, "this child is dead and not dead."
David Cooper (1973b:l63) relates a similar case of an eightyear-old boy diagnosed as a schizophrenic in "autistic withdrawal. 11
This beautiful boy of eight was brought into my
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room by his mother and father, and he wore a badge
saying, "It's wrong to eat people." He grimaced and
gesticulated and could not (or perhaps more relevantly, did not want to) sit in one place and take
part in the discussion. His mother • • • was consuming the child in terms of an orientation of her
whole mind and body to his "welfare" - protecting
him from rough friends at school and an overly
punitive headmaster who smelled out a "wrong one."
But she was erecting this abdominal wall around her
son because she was being starved, in terms beyond
the sexual, by her husband, who taught at a· universd;ty west of London. He was starving her because he was being starved of any sort of real intercourse with others by academic bureaucracy, which
mediated to him the first-world famine situation
(which seems to be hardly recognized by university
administrators, but which is protested with increasing frequency by radical students - with increasing effect).
Although some of Cooper's observations are a bit dated
and some of his semantics imply a psychoanalytic framework
that we would reject here, he does make a couple of things
clear.

First, that the youngster's conununications related

in a real sense to his family situation and were indicators
of its oppressive components.

Secondly, Cooper seems to

grasp the critical role that general cultural themes that
are reflected in work, school, and family play.

It would

be hard to overemphasize the importance of this dialectical
relationship.

It is also demonstrated in the Schreber case.

One of Dr. Schreber's child-rearing books sold nearly forty
editions and was translated into seven languages.

How could

·such a parental failure advocating "torture chamber" measures
(e.g. cold water baths at six months of age to toughen up
the baby, and a series of restraining devices to promote
good posture) be a popular source of parental education?
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The observations made by Schatzman suggest the existence of
cultural legitimations that supported Dr. Schreber's approach; this could have been the popularity of the moral
stance of harsh discipline to establish strong will power
to withstand temptation.

That his authoritarian approach

was so widely employed suggests that the theme supporting
his approach was itself modified through its intensification.
Schatzman (1975:116) suggests that we "remember that Hitler
and his peers were raised when Dr. Schreber's books, preaching household totalitarianism, were popular."
The form of social relations in capitalism tends to
heighten the problems in autonomy that we have discussed in
that children within the family tend to be viewed as objects
or conunodities.

In the following passage Juliet Mitchell

(1976:204-205) points out an important factor in oppression
and the mystification of consciousness within the family.
At present, reproduction in our society is of ten
a kind of sad mimicry of production. Work in a capitalistic society is an alienation of labor • • •
maternity is often a caricature of this. The biological product - the child - is treated as if
it were a solid product. Parenthood becomes a
kind of substitute for work, an activity in which
the child is seen as an object created by the
mother, in the same way as a conunodity is created
by the worker • • • The child as an autonomous person, inevitably threatens the activity which claims
to create it continually merely as a possession of
the parent. Possessions are felt as extensions of
the self. The child as a possession is supremely
this. Anything the child does is therefore a threat
to the mother herself • • • There are few more prec·arious ventures on which to base a life. (emphasis
in the original)
One is amazed at the degree to which mothers "compete" via
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their "products."

The comparisons and "one-upmanship" that

of ten occurs between mothers reminds one of owners showing
off the qualities of their possessions such as automobiles,
paintings, houses, and so on.

That women will often "train"

their youngsters to do the "tricks" that grant her prestige
or honor places undo pressures for the obedience of the
child.
Having dealt at some length with the politics of the
family we have overlapped in some ways the relevant aspects
of the politics of school and workplace.

We will now, very

briefly, focus our attention on these areas of everyday life.
THE POLITICS OF THE SCHOOL
What the child is exposed to in the school is a series
of.dulling and mystifying experiences in which he or she is
trained to accept authority regardless of its specific characteristics.

That schools, in conjunction with other struc-

tures (especially the family and workplace) , have been successful in this effort is evidenced in a variety of ways.
One strong indicator comes from the little research that has
been done on obedience such as the Milgram study.

This is

the least painful way for society to measure the success of
its oppressive ideological apparatus. More painfully we are
forced to learn (more accurrately, we have failed to learn)
from the inhumane behavior witnessed at Auschwitz, My Lai,
and Kent State, for example.

The schools continually func-
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tion to legitimate what is arbitrary authority in the family.
In "Death at an Early Age" Jonathan Kozol (1976:386), a
school teacher, explains the damaging nature of schooling
in Boston.
• • • the whole concept of respect for unearned
and undeserved authority is bitter and brittle and
back-breaking to children, whether rich or poor, or
black or white, within these kinds of schools • • •
No child in his heart, unless drugged by passivity,
will pay obeisance to authortty unless authority
has earned it • • • There is too much respect for
authority in the Boston schools, and too little respect for the truth. If there were more of the
latter, there would be less need of the former, and
the atmosphere of the Boston Schools would not have
to be • • • the atmosphere of a crumbling dictatorship in time of martial law.
In recent years schools have been under attack as
failing to educate students as they should.

In their anal-

ysis of this "failure," Paul Lauter and Florence Howe (1976:
390-408) suggest that schools have really been "very, indeed
horryfyingly, successful" (p.392).

Lauter and Howe call

attention to the objectives that parents and employers envision for schools in America.

They refer to a Harris poll

showing that 62 percent of the parents questioned thought
that "maintaining descipline is more important than student
self-inquiry" (p.394).

They contend that schools have

"served the desires of business for a disciplined and acquiescent work force" (p.394).

The schools have, by and

large, according to their account, been instrumental in continued oppression of those at the lower end of the social
spectrum through maintenance of the status quo.
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The confusion and obfuscation of educational goals
merely serves. to mystify the development of consciousness in
this country.

Schools pick up where the family needn't tread

to extend what Kupers, (1976) as we have discussed earlier,
refers to as numbness.

He suggests that the school is re-

sponsible for passing on deceptions regarding the history of
capitalism.

Obvious to Laing (1973b:ll0) is the role of

schools in "the mystification of experience."
ln order to rationalize our industrial-military
complex, we have to destroy our capacity to see
clearly any more what is in front of, and to imagine what is beyond, our noses. Long before a
thermonuclear war can come about, we have had to
lay waste our sanity. We begin with the children.
It is imperative to catch them in time. Without
the most thorough and rapid brainwashing their
dirty minds would see through our dirty tricks.
Children are not yet fools, but we shall turn them
into imbeciles like ourselves, with high IQ's if
possible.
As the contradictions of our world are internalized by

children then they too can share and propagate the mystification of reality.

In this way, according to Laing (1973b:

124) , "the texture •

of these socially shared hallucin-

ations [becomesj what we call reality, and our collusive
madness • • • what we call sanity."
The school encounters dissidents and disposes then in
the manner of discrediting through labeling.
labeled

Students are

either as "behavior problems" or mentally disturbed

if they don't fit in "smoothly" to the bureaucratic organ-
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First, a few comments regarding alienation in the context of insanity.

When the workplace is characterized by

extreme alienation at least two things occur.

One, the male

worker inevitably carries the numbing experience of work
home to his family where, being the possessor of virtually
unlimited power, he may respond oppressively toward his wife
and children out of feelings of frustration, powerlessness,
and irritation.

He often learns various techniques in op-

pression from his employer and incorporates these features
of oppression into his own family structure.

Another very

real consequence of experiencing alienation in the workplace
is the desire to be "free" and "autonomous" while not on the
job.

The typical strategy to effect this is to emphasize

that aspect of life that does not, in his perception, belong
to the boss.

In the process of privatization, however, the

worker finds himself in the role of consumer as he turns toward "fulfillment" in campers, boats, sunnner homes, expensive
vacations, and so on.

To purchase these commodities he finds

himself ever more tightly bound to the workplace.
takes on another job to "make the payments."

Often he

The result is

that the worker is even more numbed to his alienation than
before.

He is also modeling, and very often vocalizing, a

work ethic for his children.

He begins to perceive his role

toward them in terms of their own preparation for the workplace.
The special case of paranoia in the workplace has been
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ization.*

The psychiatrist has played a vital role in this

process according to Simon Madison (1973:127), showing his
usefulness in "his ability to label what is seen to be threatening behavior as manifestations of mental illness."
Here as in no other place there is a deluge of recordkeeping which effects almost continuous monitoring of the
student's behavior beginning with preschool.

A common no-

tation on these records follows the form "needs more selfcontrol."

Taken very literally this concern of teachers,

parents, and administrators reflects a general objective of
schools within society: To make the youngster ''obedient,
predictable, and orderly" in order that he or she will be
ideally suited for "the assembly line, the clock and calendar,
and the budget" (Scheff, 1975e:80).
THE POLITICS OF THE WORKPLACE
Much of what we have said up to this point overlaps
with a discussion of the politics of the workplace and much
work has already been done in this area especially in terms
of alienation.

Therefore we will deal very briefly with a

few of the most relevant political factors of the workplace.

* It

is an interesting problem of knowledge that resulted in the late 1960's on college campuses and many high
schools when there was a "collective" movement or deviance
that effected some changes, however minimal. It becomes difficult to label these dissidents as a "collective behavior
problem" and therefore a shift to label these students as
"communists", "radicals", or some such label to discredit
their complaints about the bureaucratic sterility of education
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The special case of paranoia in the workplace has been
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discussed by Edwin Lemert (1972}.

Paranoia as dealt with

here by Lemert relates to bureaucratically organized work
more than to factory or assembly line work per se.

In these

complex organizations a multitude of informal procedures and
sanctions are incorporated into its everyday functioning in
addition to those that are formalized.

To point these out

very often consitutes a serious faux pas in the perception
of one's superiors in an organization.

As Lemert (p.251)

puts it:
The individual is an ambiguous figure whose behavior is uncertain, whose loyalty can't be counted on. In short, he is a person who can't be
trusted because he threatens to expose informal
power structures. This, we believe, is the essential reason for the frequently encountered
idea that the paranoid person is "dangerous."
The "paranoid" person may perceive, for example, that
an informal meeting between powerful figures has preceded
the ongoing formal meeting; the former meeting having been
the one in which the decisions were really made.

If the

"paranoid 11 (more accurately something like the "perceptive
one"} is so indiscreet as to point out this informal procedure, he or she will thus initiate an uncomfortable and
embarrassing episode.

Uncomfortable in that confrontation,

a rare thing in "manipulated meetings," is open and direct;
embarrassing because the real distribution of power is laid
bare.

What Lemert observes is that the informal and formal

mechanisms respond quickly to exclude the "paranoid" from
participating in matters in which he or she could further
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disrupt the smooth "normal" operations of the organization.
One way is to place the "paranoid" in a "harmless" job.
Another is to systematically restrict his or her access to
important information and processes.

A third strategy is

to affix the label "paranoid" to the individual.

It is rel-

atively easy to legitimate the label in that many formal or
procedural rules can be called into play to discredit the
"paranoid's" insight.

A superior, for instance, could re-

spond by saying: "Now, John calm down.

Yor're just upset.

You know as well as I do that this committee operates according to specified procedure.

Don't be so paranoid!"

The

systematic exclusion of the "paranoid" will very often effect
a self-fulfilling prophecy of these earlier allusions to his
paranoia.

If he maintains his indiscreet posture he may

soon find himself fired on psychological grounds as he responds to the exclusionary tactics of his associates.

He

may also find himself in a mental hospital grappling with
the same dynamics in a different setting.
In all forms of the workplace any effort to organize
labor is met firmly with a strategy of discrediting labels.
The history of the labor movement is one of allusions to
criminality, treason, communism, and other deviant categories
on the part of labor organizers.

The relative lack of en-

thusiasm to organize on the part of workers attest to their
own mystified or reif ied consciousness or numbness emanating
from the collusion of family, school, workplace and supportive
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legitimating ideologies such as psychiatry and criminal justice in the use of discrediting labels to maintain socially
constructed realities.

CHAPTER V
A RADICAL MODEL FOR INTERPRETING
SOCIOPSYCHOLOGICAL PROBLEMS IN LIVING
A serious danger at this point in any argument would
be to unquestioningly accept the proposed perspective on
the basis of its plausibility.

This very problem has been

identified as a central feature of the critique of traditional psychiatric approaches that this paper has offered.

Im-

portant questions must be asked and acceptable answers

g~ven

lest we "launch off" on another myth-ridden journey into the
human mind. For example, what does this perspective on mental
distress predict?
approach?

What findings would lend support to this

A strategy for the presentation of such issues

that will be employed in this chapter is the development of
a set of propositions and corollaries that should be tested
to provide indications as to the acceptability of a radical
sociology of knowledge framework in the analysis of insanity.
A major advantage of this tactic is increased clarity of the
approach by virtue of its explication in propositional form.
In the development of the propositions that follow attention
is focused primarily upon theoretical content and their implications. Therefore all of the methodological issues raised
by a particular proposition will not be addressed here.
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Suffice it to say that adherence to a strictly positivistic
approach is not the answer to the majority of research questions that are generated by the following propositions.
Those questions are necessarily characterized to a large
degree by phenomenological inquiry and sociohistorical analysis for which strict positivism is poorly equipped (which
would seem to demonstrate its general methodological inadequacy).

Nevertheless, there are examples of some alternative

methodologies that have already been employed which are suggestive of possible strategies for deriving some of the data
that are not ascertainable by traditional methodologies.

For

example, some ethnomethodologists like Alan Blum (1970) have
offered phenomenological analyses of language as it is employed within psychiatric settings.

Also, Armand Mauss

(1975:319-356) has presented a sociohistorical perception of
the concept of mental illness as a social movement. *

De-

velopment of methodologies similar to these will undoubtedly
provide some of the necessary research tools.
The propositions are stated very generally and are far
from being exhaustive.

They are arranged in a manner that

tends to move from the broader issues of insanity to those

*Mauss'

approach is in response to Herbert Blumer's
(1971) contention that social problems must be perceived as
collective behavior. Blumer's call for a heightened socio··
logical sensitivity to the way in which societies respond to
their various problems and in doing so largely determine the
premises upon which they will be perceived is certainly shown
to be relevant in the case of insanity.
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that are more specific.
PROPOSITION I.

That sociohistorical analysis will

show that the concept of mental illness and the
patterns of societal response to it are social constructions deriving from the massive transformation of social relationships that occurred in the
shift from feudalism to capitalism.
In the historical period just referred to by this
proposition numerous new and different social arrangements
emerged.

John and Virginia Demos (1973) offer a brilliant

analysis of the way in which the concept of adolescence also
emerged within this period and Rothman (1971) related the
manner in which social changes in this period led to new
social responses to old and new problems.

The following

three corollaries point to some of the factors within developing capitalism that have been instrumental in molding
the concept of mental illness and the patterns of social
response to it.
COROLLARY IA.

That with the development of capi-

talism the workplace and conditions of living experienced increasing complexity such that many individuals that could have functioned adequately
within an agrarian setting found it increasingly
difficult to cope with everging labor requirements.
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The many components that undergird successful competition in the labor market are easy to take for granted.

When

compared with the requirements within feudal society, however, the number of required skills and attributes that go
into finding and holding a job in capitalist society are
multitudinous.

For instance, one must complete enough

schooling to at least read and in many cases a prospective
employee must possess some minimal academic degree.

If one

wants to excel in the labor pool he or she must plan sufficiently ahead to acquire the special training or education
required by a position that one may not even apply for until
several years later such as in any position requiring a graduate degree.

One must also be able to arrange for the neces-

sities of everyday life - housing, making up a budget, shopping, transportation, filing income tax returns, filling out
all kinds of forms, and so on.
in advanced capitalism are many.

The mental skills required
Increasing complexity of

labor and living arrangements may contribute in some ways to
the actual incidence of mental disorders by virtue of exacerbating an individual's confusion or perceptual difficulties.

More importantly, though, this increasing complexity

undoubtedly accounts for extension of the label of mental
illness to encompass a wide range of behavioral difficulties
raised by a new set of social arrangements.
An analysis of labor market changes over the last 200
years and the reported rates of mental illness should show
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a significant relationship between the two; the more complex
the labor requirements the higher the reported incidence of
mental disorders.
COROLLARY IB.

That massive urbanization and in-

creased social and geographical mobility produced
a shift in responsibility from the family to society
for the care of those experiencing mental diff iculties.
At the same time that increasing social complexity
bro.a~dened

the . definition of mental deviance, family networks

became increasingly fractionalized and less capable of normalizing such behavior.

In previous social relationships,

such as the extended family rooted in an agrarian society,
there existed a communal form of responsibility for those
experiencing mental difficulties.

Undoubtedly much of what

is labeled today as serious mental impairment was normalized
within these extended kinship networks.

With the advent of

capitalism and the emergence of the nuclear family the responsibility for the mentally deviant was socialized, ironically enough, to a level of impersonal and systematized
treatment characterized by extensive stigma to the deviants.
It is no coincidence that the insane asylum appeared in the
same era as did workhouses and prisons, as is shown by Rothman (1971).

In fact, as Rosen (1968:277) indicates, many

of the mentally disturbed were still located within poor-
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houses, jails, and similar facilities as late as the middle
of the nineteenth century, attesting to the fact that these
innovations were different components of a common problem:

that capitalism effected a massive reordering of social forms
as well as a serious disruption of the labor market.
A thorough analysis of documents, records, and personal
accounts should show that mental deviance was handled almost
entirely within extended kinship networks in pre-capitalistic
society.

Such sources of data should also reveal a progres-

sive movement to more depersonalized and stigmatizing societal responses to this phenomenon.
One could put forward the argument that the alarming
increases in criminality, juvenile delinquency, poverty, and
mental disorders that characterized this period are attributable to unemployment, underemployment, and increasing
demand for superior mental skills and abilities.

There was

a total absence of governmental responses to alleviate these
difficulties except in the most superficial way.
COROLLARY IC.

That the bias within early capitalism

toward a "laissez-faire" governmental posture yielded
a response directed simply toward getting the socially undesirable people out of the public's view.
The types of societal responses that were made reveal,
according to Mauss, that the government was simply doing the
least that it could to solve these problems.

The incipiency
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of the mental health movement reflected the basic strategy
of getting deviants "out of sight and out of mind 11

-

it did

not represent a rational response to the latest advances in
behavioral science.
While the 18th century brought with it asylums
in Europe and almshouses in America, these developments only seemed to represent moves to get the
mentally disordered "off the streets," rather than
reflecting significant changes in the attitude toward this form of deviance. These new institutions
largely served a custodial function, and were characterized by extremely heterogeneous populations of
unfortunates. (Mauss, 1975:337)
Not enough attention has been given to the way in which
social responses to mental disorders have operated to mediate
the disruptions caused by industrial capitalism.*

The :men-

tally disordered are not the only social category that have
been generated and stigmatized by the changes that have occurred.

According to Goffman we can understand the nature

of the social response to mental disorders by viewing it as
one among several responses to people who represent problems
for capitalistic society.
• • • we must see the mental hospital in the recent historical context in which it developed, as
one among a network of institutions designed to

* This point is not directly refuted by virtue of similar responses to mental disorders in socialist or conununist
countries. The predominant modes of conceptualization of
mental disorder were developed within capitalistic social
structures and contemporary conceptions workdwide (in advanced
societies) are still heavily burdened with the past, a point
on which we will further elaborate shortly. There is some
indication, however, according to Sidel (1975), tha,t responses to mental disorders in China operate from very different premises than those of American psychiatric practice,
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provide a residence for various categories of socially troublesome people. These institutions include nursing homes, general hospitals, veteran's
homes, jails, geriatrics clinics, homes for the
mentally retarded, work farms, orphanages, and oldfolks' homes. (Goffman, 1973:30)
Sociohistorical analysis of the sort implied by this proposition should yield a picture of continuous obfuscation and
mystification of the issues of insanity as the result of using an inadequate model (i.e. the medical model) which has
severely restricted the ability to scientifically investigate
this area (Mauss, 1975:356).

The medical model did provide

a handy legitimation for the way in which the mentally deviant were being handled.

Like any other sick person the

mental deviant was carted off to some appropriate facility
at which he or she could be adequately "treated."
Paradoxically the government was being asked to take
care of society's growing number of deviants while at the
same time there was a strong predilection to adhere to the
Spencerian notion that the internal dynamics of capitalism
would work themselves out.

Critical evaluations of the harm-

ful effects of the status quo simply did not exist.

The

emerging system was taken for granted and the growing numbers
of undesirables simply stored in social warehouses.

for example. Much more investigation of this matter is needed
before any conclusions can be drawn. Such investigations of
these issues in socialist or communist countries should be
sensitive to the ways in which existing responses to mental
disorders have emerged historically and how they function at
present to bolster the existing political arrangements.
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PROPOSITION II.

That traditional psychiatric and psy-

chological practice functions, to a significant degree,
as a mechanism of social control.
Given the burgeoning volume of criticism that has been directed toward psychiatric thinking one has to wonder why it
has been so resistant to change.

One possible answer is that

psychiatric practice has provided a needed mechanism for legitimating oppressive responses to those who manage to voice
objections, challenges, or queries to the sta.tus quo.

The

dimension of psychiatric practice characterized by social
control activities does not typically resemble the form of
conspiring actors toward "politically dangerous" persons.
Rather it generally appears, at least in a one-dimensional
society, almost imperceptably as an ideological or ethical
component which thrusts anyone who questions the "givens"
of his or her social world into the role of the deviant.

The

fabric of our society is interwoven with a plethora of institutional, governmental, and bureaucratic edifices that are
served by this kind of ideological structure.

comprehensive

sociohistorical analysis should uncover a large number of
parties and interests that have been, and that now are, served
by traditional thought and response to mental disorders and
how their power and influence have in turn served to entrench
traditional thinking.

This calls for Marxian extension of

the analyses offered by Rothman (1971), Mauss (1975:ch9),
Rosen (1968) and Richard La Piere (1959) in terms of the re-
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lationship between the transformations and interrelatinships
within capitalistic society and social construction of the
concept of mental illness and the emergence of mental hos-

pitals and psychiatric treatment.
The pervasive use of psychiatric or psychological intervention in our lives can be seen as taking up the slack
that exists as the result of the erosion of important "cooling out" mechanisms such as religious instruction which was
instrumental in getting people, especially in earlier historical periods, to yield to a variety of oppressive relationships; to accept their "stations in life."

When areas in

which psychiatry and psychology are employed are investigated
they will reveal this function in many different forms.

The

most overt examples have been identified by Brown (1973:xv).
Industrial psychologists make factory workers more
"comfortable," but only in ways to sap their militancy and thus insure corporate prof it • • • Advertising psychologists aid the corporations on the
opposite end by brainwashing people into consuming
harmful and/or meaningless products, with the promise of financial and/or sexual success if the correct products are bought. School psychologists
push working class children into vocational tracts
• • • they counsel students against militancy • • •
{and] report their "antisocial" attitudes to the
higher administration. Military psychologists
polish the machinery of U.S. imperialism • • • providing "adjustment" for antiwar GI's and counseling
bomber pilots so they won't feel guilty about napalming Vietnamese. Behavior modification experts
work out tortures to "cure" deviants • • • Social
psychologists perform research for counterinsurgency
plans at home and abroad • • • State hospitals jack
people up on thorazine and give electroshock or lobotomies to working class people whose behavior would
never be "treated" if they were wealthy.
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The corollaries that follow point out some of the general ways in which traditional psychiatric thought enhances
the status quo.
COROLLARY !IA.

That the inherent focus in psychi-

atric theory and treatment upon the individual has
blurred vision into the sociological and social psychological dimensions of insanity.
A thoroughgoing survey of the predominant theories
and modes of treatment should demonstrate that traditional
psychiatric thought excludes all but the most individualistic factors involved in mental disorders.

This observa-

tion may sound overly simplistic but it must be pointed out
that adherence to models and theories that rule out the

pos~

sibility of the etiological significance of social factors
will only generate research and findings that invariably
support the theory or model.

Truly scientific perspectives

seek to find instances or findings that would qualify the
theory or model.

Self-validating perspectives serve no le-

gitimate scientific purposes although they may often provide
valuable commodities to some parties.

Again, the propaga-

tion of social fictions that are very real in their consequences do not have to be conspiratorial in nature.

Psy-

chiatrists are typically exposed to a lengthy experience of
secondary socialization in which they inculcate the "truths"
and techniques of their profession.

They have a definite

vested interest in these "truths" in that they help to pre-
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serve the lofty rung in the social ladder upon which the
psychiatrist stands.

Few choose to criticize their own com-

fortable profession (seldom is it the king who both perceives the treachery of his reign and rises up in revolt
against it).

Still some psychiatrists have risen up in re-

bellion and the number of theorists that point to social
factors is growing, albeit very slowly.

The vast majority,

unfortunately, still respond to their patients as the locus
of the causal forces relevant to their current distresses.
COROLLARY IIB.

That mental health practitioners

typically "treat" their patients by prescribing some
form of adjustment to oppressive living conditions.
This corollary could be construed to imply the assumption that all mental disorders are characterized by oppressive living conditions.

To overcome this difficulty it

would be necessary to evaluate a sample of patients in terms
of all potential factors contributing to their present difficulties that could be defined as oppressive.

This evalu-

ation would then be compared to the therapists' evaluations
to answer two different questions:

(1) Did the therapist

uncover the oppressive characteristics of the patients' environment if any exist? and, ( 2) ,mid the tiherapis.t, iW:hen aware
of oppressive conditions, seek to alter those conditions or
to promote adjustment to unaltered conditions?

In other

words, a therapist may promote adjustment to oppressive con-
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ditions unwittingly be adhering to a line of inquiry that
inherently obviates the discovery of such factors by virtue
of an exclusive focus on the individual or he may do so by
directly facilitating adjustment to known conditions of oppression, whenever oppressive contingencies are relevant to
a disorder.
The potential use of residual categories of psychiatric
distresses such as schizophrenia or neurosis to mask the existence of oppressive relationships should not be overlooked.
A therapist may, for example, decide for a number of possible
reasons to avoid confronting a pejorative living condition
by using a vague diagnostic label to conveniently "locate"
the problem within the patient.

For instance, the therapist

may engender financial reward, prestige, or some other similar payoff by overlooking the existence of an oppressive
relationship.
COROLLARY IIC.

That most psychiatric diagnostic

categories are social constructions that are devoid
of a scientifically skeptical dimension and which
are sufficiently vague so as to be of little use in
interpreting or treating behavior and which exist,
therefore, as self-validating constructs.
We have already referred to the research of Caetano
(1974), Greenley (1975), Obeysekere (1975), Rosenhan (1975),
Siamak (1975), and Temerlin (1975) which have some bearing
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on this issue.
ever.

These studies are far from exhaustive, how-

We need to know more about specific diagnostic cat-

egories1 where they originated sociohistorically, how they
are linked to the medical model, and how they are applied
within actual psychiatric settings.

This topic is crucial

since, according to ethnomethodologists like Blum (1970:38),
"mental illness is possible because [people], in very small
and ordinary ways, treat certain behavior as 'mentally ill'
and collaboratively develop systematic ways of recognizing,
categorizing, and acting upon such behavior."

That is to

say, that particular patterns of social interaction are instrumental in constructing the taken-for-granted reality of
mental illness.

If we pursue Blum's contention we would

systematically observe the way in which categories or descriptions are actually applied to individuals within psychiatric settings.
COROLLARY !ID.

That psychiatric diagnostic categor-

ies are used with regularity to discredit individuals
making legitimate claims as to the conditions of
their families, school environments, work, government,
and other similar entities.
In much previous discussion the nature of discrediting
labeling has been explicated.

Little research, however,

exists to substantiate the claims that have been made.

Sam-

ples of patients should be evaluated especially in regard to
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the observations that they relate pertaining to their living
conditions.

Comparisons between the patients' perceptions

and the actual nature of the living conditions should evi-

dence a significant proportion of the cases in which the
patient is reasonably depicting the existence of oppressive
relationships.

As the works of Laing, Szasz, and Cooper

demonstrate, extreme sensitivity to modes of communication
employed and the problems of translation is essential.

In

cases where the patient is relating oppressive conditions
of his or her living situations observations should be made
to determine the degree to which the therapist has understood and responded to the patients' claims.

Investigations

at this point should be especially sensitive to the use of
diagnostic labels to discredit the patient.

Once again, the

act of discrediting labeling need not be conspiratorial in
nature, although one should suspect that this is sometimes
the case.

The absence of inquiries into patients' social

environments or the failure to decipher, or even attempt to
decipher, their communications grants a large measure of
credibility to the labels that are affixed to persons who
in very odd ways attempt to relate their painful experiences.
The stigma associated with the label still acts to discredit
the patient and any past or future claims that are made regarding his or her social environment.
This type of research should move on to cross-cultural
investigations.

These probes should show a higher incidence
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of discrediting labeling within capitalistic societies or
any other type of society characterized by a predominance
of sociopsychological manipulation and oppression..

These

types of sociopsychological manipulations, according to radical analysis, are woven into the very fabric of capitalist
societies.
PROPOSITION III.

That oppressive agencies of so-

cialization are instrumental in producing and/or exacerbating many mental disorders.
Our analysis has recounted the ways in which the various agencies of socialization within capitalistic society
are often engaged in the oppressive transmission of a conception of reality that is presented as inevitable and infallible.

The very fact that individuals are socialized to

accept the social constructions of reality of their families
and social groups as inevitable can result in serious dis•

tortion of their perceptual abilities.

If one should suffer

from the nature of oppressive living conditions his or her
ability to identify the source of suffering and successfully
communicate that observation to others is often severely
restricted.

For the individual suffering from some other

source of debilitation, such as endocrinic, genetic, or
neurological defects, this type of socialization experience
operates to intensify the person's confusion or disorientation •
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Extensions of the research that has inspected various
dimensions of the authoritarian personality should further
demonstrate the perceptual distortions der:d.ving from authoritarian socialization practices.
COROLLARY IIIA.

That early oppression in the fam-

ily restricts development of the self (in a Meadian
sense) and other aspects of genuine autonomy in the
child.
The case studies related by Laing and Cooper point out
the likely relationship between oppressive family structures
and the incidence of mental distress in those upon whom such
oppression is focused.

Much more investigation of the mes-

sages offered by the mentally disturbed is needed to explicate the relationship between oppressive socialization and
the development of individual autonomy that is demonstrated
in intrapersonal communication between the "I" and the "me."
Complete development of the self allows one to fully distinquish between acts and attitudes that are initiated by
one's self and those initiated by others.

A youngster that

has been oppressively trained is severely restricted from
either initiating genuinely autonomous actions or even perceiving that his or her actions derive from parental training.
Also samples of mental patients should be inspected in
terms of the incidence of relevant oppressive family struc-
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tures.

It is possible that different forms of family op-

pression are linked to specific types of mental difficulties.
Unfortunately, little work has been done in this area.

Some

studies investigating double-bind family structures, however,
touch on this area, especially in pointing to the effects of
overly dominant mothers upon children.

A more explicit em-

phasis upon the role of oppression in these studies of family
structures should provide some of the answers to the questions that have been raised here.
COROLLARY IIIB.

That early experiences of oppres-

sion severely incapacitate a person's ability to
identify oppressive contingencies and to relate
those contingencies to others.
An oppressive parent may refuse to allow a child the

possibility of referring to him or her with any negative
symbols.

The youngster therefore has access only to posi-

tive symbols when referring to the parent.

Thus, it becomes

impossible to locate the source of one's suffering or pain
within one's parent.

Schatzman points out the way in which

Schreber's father accomplished this withholding of negative
symbols for himself from his son.

Even many years later

Schreber was still unable to link negative symbols with his
father.

Research should be directed toward the symbolic

capabilities of mental patients in reference to parents or
other significant persons.

91

The possibility also exists that a range of emotions
that for most people have been ascribed comfortable symbolic
status have been denied symbolic referents for those suffering from mental distress.

The observations made by Szasz

certainly point to the very real difficulties that sufferers
of mental distress have in communicating their feelings.
Obviously, much more research into these areas is needed.
COROLLARY IIIC.

That oppressive responses by mental

health professionals further mystify the relationships within which those suffering from sociopsychological distress find themselves.
If, as we have contended, the mentally distressed individual eXPeriences severe perceptual and communicational
distortion and confusion then further oppressive responses
from therapists will only intensify the problem.

Thrusting

the mental patient into a situation in which he or she is
given a variety of alleged internal constructs (e.g. anal
fixation, latent homosexual love, Oedipal conflicts, etc.}
merely serves to compound the confusion that is experienced.
Attention is shifted away from external empirical factors
to internal abstractions.

The patient is forced to think

and communicate in this mode by virtue of the fact that this
is the mode established by the therapist who, by definition,
stands in a superordinate position to the patient within the
therapeutic setting.

The patient may also feel compelled to
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communicate within the confines of this mode for fear of
losing what may be his or her only source of attention and
response to the experienced problems.
presents a dual problem:

For the patient this

Cl) the objective living condi-

tions that are instrumental in the present difficulty are
not being dealt with; and, (2) the patient has now been labeled and stigmatized in such a manner that complaints or
rejection of the dominant therapeutic mode would simply lend
credence to the label that has been used.

A systematic in-

vestigation of the therapeutic milieu through a series of
participant observational studies should help to illuminate
these processes.
PROPOSITION IV.

That, when the individual challenges

accepted socially constructed reality, a number of
intrapersonal processes are set in motion which
generate, to varying degrees, a variety of sociopsychological distresses.
The preceding propositions and corollaries address
the way in which agencies of socialization and social control
interact to entrench conventional conceptions of reality in
the minds of individuals.

When, for whatever reason, one

challenges these conventional conceptions a number of internal and external events occur which, at best, will yield
some rather unpleasant and stressful experiences and which,
at worst, will lead to complete loss of contact with one's
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fellows and the reality shared therewith.
COROLLARY IVA.

That one consequence of challenging

generally accepted notions of social reality is the
emergence of experiences of confusion, doubt, or
guilt that, if severe enough, will eventuate in serious mental impairment.
In the process of terminating one's allegiance to a
reality that has been internalized over a lengthy period of
time one may be left in a state of limbo or seclusion from
a solid social base of reality.

The bonafide revolutionary

will be among those that will undoubtedly suffer the least
in such situations in that he or she is typically shedding
one socially based perception of reality for one that is
unconventional, radical, or unpopular but which still has
some social foundation.

The extreme comradery that often

characterizes revolutionary groups undoubtedly reflects the
need for a socially shareable alternative reality for such
people.

The atheist in a predominantly religious culture

may have more difficulty in finding a shareable conceptual
alternative.

In both cases there is the liklihood that

numerous experiences of confusion, doubt, and guilt will
creep into the consciousness of the challengers.

The young-

ster rejecting the reality imposed by the family will experience even more difficulty.

Who is there to share his or

her deviant perception of the family situation?

This person
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may very well be locked into intrapersonal communication regarding the family yielding increasing reliance upon idiosyncratic symbols which intensify the communicational prob-

lems as they spill over into interpersonal interaction, in
which contexts they stimulate negative social reactions.
These aversive social experiences will in turn engender
greater reliance upon idiosyncratic intrapersonal communication.

The point may come, as is suggested in the observa-

tions made by Laing, Cooper, Schatzman, and others, where
the distressed individual may no longer be able to distinguish between the self and others or between intrapersonal
and interpersonal communication.
COROLLARY IVB.

That a second consequence of chal-

lenging conventional conceptions of reality is an
ensuing process of social reactions that tend to intensify the feelings of confusion, doubt, and guilt.
The typical response to unconventional or deviant conceptions of reality is one of intolerance, ridicule, and
castigation.

Ranging from a raised eyebrow to some type of

physical punishment, these responses tend to elicit feelings
of hesitancy and anxiety.

If one persists, a process of sys-

tematic exclusion from further interaction may follow which
contributes to the shrinkage of one's social base for sharing reality.

As Lemert has so perceptively observed, the

"dynamics of exclusion" serve to amplify the problems ex-
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perienced by the deviant and so grant credence to the contention that he or she is increasingly "psychotic" or "emotionally disturbed."
The psychiatric labels that are often applied may
evoke such morbid fear in the mind of the labeled person
that he or she is disoriented to the point of fulfilling the
most extreme symptoms that are implied by the particular
label.

The child that goes against strong parental direc-

tives can also experience the debilitating effects of intense
fear.

For example, the youngster who masturbates after being

continually warned that it will cause "madness" may experience a degree of anxiety sufficient to precipitate behavior
that is supposedly symptomatic of that "madness."
It is easy to overstate the case embodied in the last
two corollaries; but this shouldn't effect a barrier to the
kind of investigations that would shed light on these issues.
Admittedly, developing appropriate methods of inquiry into
these questions would be difficult.

One could, however, ob-

serve and interview subjects displaying various types and
degrees of deviant conceptual constructs in a number of
natural and experimental settings to determine some of the
intra- and interpersonal processes involved.
The foregoing set of propositions and corollaries are
offered as a beginning point for research that would move
from a radical sociology of knowledge perspective on the
issue of insanity.

To this point investigation into these
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areas has been minimal and much of the argument is more rhetorical than demonstrably empirical.

Often the findings that

do exist are the result of dubious techniques such as case
studies.

What is needed is a rigorous and comprehensive re-

search effort begining with these propositions or similarly
constructed statements that clarify this position both in
terms of prediction and those conditions under which it
should hold.

CHAPTER VI
CONCLUSIONS
In our sociological excursus into the ambiguous world
of insanity we have witnessed how that psychiatry and the
concept of "mental illness" have evolved as a historical response of society to an enduring social problem.

The soci-

ology of knowledge, when modified to incorporate the distribution of power in social relationships, proves to be an
effective analytic tool by which to chip away the heavy
scales of mystification and reification that have enshrouded
both the past and contemporaneous role of knowledge and consciousness in the societal response to insanity.

A radical

sociology of knowledge provides the necessary link between
phenomenological and dialectical approaches that enables us
to more completely conceptualize the social construction of
reality in history.

The treatment of this point in this

paper has largely been suggestive; this formulation is subject to considerable refinement and clarification.
In terms of the "antipsychiatry" literature this frame.:.
work provides the crucial focus upon the relationship between
individual crises in knowledge and the nature of knowledge
in its everyday life contexts inasmuch as i t is sensitive
to the dialectical and phenomenological relationship between
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individual and society.

Our analysis has suggested the ad-

vantages of a radical sociology of knowledge over a radical
psychology as an interpretive framework for the general critique of the mental health establishment found in the "antipsychiatry" literature.

A radical psychology will do justice

to only half of the dialectical relationship between man and
society.

This is not to invalidate some of the intermediary

findings that such a perspective may reveal.

Certainly the

role of biopsychological factors in various aspects of defective socialization needs much further clarification; but
the "antipsychiatry movement" calls for a much more comprehensive analysis of these issues.

The very sociohistorical

context of the "movement" is rooted in a general critique of
captialism that gained momentum in the 1960's.

This factor

linked with the disappointing failures of traditional psychiatric and psychological approaches regarding insanity has
continually pointed toward the role of external factors.
This is a call for the holistic analysis of a radical sociology of knowledge which, unlike traditional psychological
and sociological perspectives, treats both social structure
and individual consciousness as parts of the same process.
An added advantage of this framework is its inherent relativistic nature which should make it less susceptable to the
crystallization or reification that had been so pervasive in
analyses of the phenomenon of insanity.
Another advantage is the fact that a radical sociology
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of knowledge carries with it a sociopsychological perspective
(i.e. Meadian social psychology) that has become increasingly
acceptable to Marxists.

This nascent perspective refuses to

conceive of the individual qua individual; rather it promotes
an image of man as a social being whose consciousness is a
social product.

The suggestions regarding the incorporation

of the Meadian perspective into radical analysis needs to be
inspected in much greater detail than we have been able to
do here.
We have also suggested what is felt to be a coherent
method of incorporating the labeling perspective within radical sociological theory.

This involves conceptualizing the

process of labeling as an aspect of social control based
upon the discrediting of deviants and their insights, observations, and complaints, in efforts to buttress the status
quo.

Addition of the factors of differential power distri-

bution to traditional labeling arguments has enabled us to
discuss everyday life in terms of its political dimensions
sensitizing us to the existence of the oppressive use of
labeling at this level of social life.

We have been able to

discuss this oppression as the indirect effect of the class
struggle in Western society, thus avoiding the pitfalls of
mechanistic Marxism.

The point to be stressed is that those

possessing positions of relative power tend to utilize that
power to reify the status quo in their own interests.
Our investigation has revealed a paucity of research
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into many important issues of insanity.

Much of the research

that has been carried out moves from self-validating premises
of traditional psychiatric approaches.

In response we have

developed a set of propositions that, if tested, would lay
the empirical groundwork for a radical investigation of
"mental illness."

The propositional model is a mere skeletal

configuration of what wholesale investigation of these issues
would involve.

Thus, there are many questions that have

gone unaddressed in this inquiry.
For example, we have dealt with some specific "mental
disorders" and suggested some ways to analyze the role of
oppression in their etiology and remediation.
needs much more exploration and clarification.

This area
We failed

to deal with such psychiatric categories as neurosis, alcoholism, or manic-depressive psychosis.

If, as we have sug-

gested, the oppressed are calling for help via a "mental disorder" why is it that a specific disorder is chosen over
others?

The psychiatric categories of schizophrenia, par-

anoia, and hysteria continually emerge in the "antipsychiatry"
literature.

Is it possible that these are the only categories

in which oppression is implicated as a causal force?

What

is the role of oppression upon different processes of socialization that might lead to particular types of behavioral responses?

These are some of the questions that arise from

our investigation that when addressed should further clarify
the role of oppression in the etiology of insanity.

101

In terms of treatment, a radical sociology of knowledge
implies a dual strategy of working with individuals to impart to them an understanding of the inherent problems of
socially constructed reality and to help them modify the
oppressive contingencies within their own environments.

This

approach suggests that "crazy" communications be inspected
in terms of complaint and suffering rather than disorder and
illness.

A question for the future is an unenviable analysis

of the family; its oppressive characteristics and the various
alternatives to it.

The sticky issue of intervention into

families and the legal rights of parents will become paramount in this discussion.
It is certain that the effects of isolation and dehumanization characteristic of mental hospitals and psychiatric treatment are decidedly pejorative according to this
framework; social reality is best maintained through language,
conversation, and interaction; not warehousing.
Though the questions that have been raised by this investigation far outweigh the answers one has to feel confident that at least some of the dimensions of insanity can
be fruitfully conceptualized within a radical sociology of
knowledge.

It certainly represents a marked improvement

over traditional responses to insanity and yields a coherent
mode for conceptualization of the "antipsychiatry" insights.
We should repeat the observation that a radical analysis of insanity within Western society such as that offered
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in this paper should in no way be construed to mean that insanity is caused by capitalism per se.

Obviously insanity

exists in all known types of society, both primitive and so-

cialist.

Cross-societal research into insanity investiga-

ting the role of oppression should help us to further understand the operation of knowledge as it is dialectically constructed and as it relates to the problems of consciousness
suggested by Marx and others.
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